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Abstract: Security is an important quality aspect of modern open software systems. However, it 
is challenging to keep such systems secure because of evolution. Security evolution can only be 
managed adequately if it is considered for all artifacts throughout the software development 
lifecycle. This article provides state of the art on the evolution of security engineering artifacts. 
The article covers the state of the art on evolution of security requirements, security 
architectures, secure code, security tests, security models, and security risks as well as security 
monitoring. For each of these artifacts we give an overview of evolution and security aspects and 
discuss the state of the art on its security evolution in detail. Based on this comprehensive survey, 
we summarize key issues and discuss directions of future research. 
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Introduction 
 
Due to ever changing surroundings, new 
business needs, new regulations and new 
technologies, a software system must evolve, 
or it becomes progressively less satisfactory 
(Lehman, 1980, 1998). On the one hand, the 
continuous system evolution makes it 
especially challenging to keep software 
systems permanently secure as changes, 
either in the system itself or in its 
environment, may cause new threats and 
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, security 
artifacts themselves like security 
requirements, security architectures, and 
secure code or security tests have to be 
continuously adapted in long-running 
software systems. Because modern open and 
  
dynamically-changing software systems like 
service-oriented architectures or cloud 
deployments determine business process 
implementations and deal with critical data, 
managing the evolution of their security 
artifacts in all phases of the software 
development lifecycle (SDLC) is of high 
importance. 
The main phases of the SDLC are 
analysis, design, implementation, testing, as 
well as deployment and operation (Braude & 
Bernstein, 2011). In each phase, specific 
artifacts are created or adapted, i.e., 
requirements in the analysis phase, the 
architecture in the design phase, source code 
in the implementation phase, tests in the 
testing phase, as well as the running system 
in the deployment and operation phase. All 
these artifacts are subject to changes which 
is one of the main difficulties of software 
evolution (Mens & Demeyer, 2008) with 
high impact on security engineering. 
Security engineering focuses on security 
aspects in the software development 
lifecycle. Security aims at protecting 
information and systems from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, perusal, inspection, recording 
or destruction. The main objective of 
security is to guarantee confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information and 
systems. To be most effective, security must 
be integrated into the software development 
lifecycle from the very beginning (Kissel et 
al., 2008). 
Risk management in general is the 
process allowing organizations to identify 
what assets need to be protected, what 
threats prevail and with what probability and 
severity losses could occur. As such it is an 
indispensable activity in security 
engineering to identifying and to manage 
threats and vulnerabilities to information as 
well as systems. 
Model engineering involves the 
systematic use of models as essential 
artifacts throughout the software 
development process (Schmidt, 2006). It has 
recently been applied in security engineering 
to provide security models for all phases of 
the software development lifecycle to 
manage the evolution of security engineering 
artifacts. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the security 
engineering activities and the assigned 
artifacts in the secure software development 
lifecycle. In each iteration, the activities 
analysis, design, implementation, 
development as well as deployment are 
performed consecutively. Additionally, risk 
management and model engineering 
accompany these activities. As the system 
and its environment evolve, all these 
activities are executed iteratively which is 
represented by the surrounding border. Each 
phase handles specific artifacts, i.e., 
requirements, architecture, code, tests, 
running system, models and risks. 
Each of these artifacts corresponds to 
sections in this article with respect to its 
security-specific evolution aspects. 
Managing the evolution of security 
engineering artifacts is an important task that 
needs specific approaches to continuously 
guarantee security. 
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Figure 1. Security Engineering Activities, Security Artifacts and Section Overview 
This article reviews the state of the art of 
evolution management of security 
engineering artifacts and draws conclusions 
for future research. Section Security Model 
Evolution discusses security model 
evolution, and Section Security 
Requirements Evolution covers evolution of 
security requirements. Section Security 
Architecture Evolution discusses security 
architecture evolution, while Section Secure 
Code Evolution analyzes evolution of secure 
code. Then, Section Security Test Evolution 
discusses evolution aspects of testing. 
Section Security Monitoring Evolution 
explains methods to control security 
monitoring of a running system. Section 
Security Risks shows approaches for security 
risk evolution. Finally, we summarize the 
state of the art and sketch future directions 
of research. Each section follows a similar 
structure. After a short introduction to key 
aspects of the respective artifact, we discuss 
its security engineering and evolution. 
Finally, we combine these two aspects and 
discuss the state of the art of its security 
evolution in detail. Each section was written 
by proven experts in the respective area the 
article has therefore overall 16 authors who 
compiled the literature for the particular 
artifacts based on their in-depth knowledge 
and experience. This state of the art survey 
on evolution of security engineering artifacts 
is partially based on a previous state of the 
art survey (Felderer, Kalb, et al., 2011). 
  
Security Model Evolution 
 
Modern software and security engineering, 
uses models to define software systems and 
their components on a high level of 
abstraction. The de-facto industrial standard 
for modeling both structural and behavioral 
aspects of IT systems is the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML). In this section, 
we therefore focus on UML models. As 
modern IT systems are under continuous 
change, also the models change and evolve 
over time. As an implication of using models 
for security aspects, evolution has to be 
considered also for security concepts and 
methodologies. In the context of security 
there are at least two different dimensions of 
model evolution, i.e., target and granularity 
of evolution. 
The first dimension, i.e., target of 
evolution, can be classified into two 
categories, i.e., security properties and 
artifact evolution. On the one hand, the 
security properties linked to an artifact can 
change, which cannot be avoided for life-
long systems. This can have multiple reasons 
such as changes in the business security 
objectives and standards or the identification 
of new threats. One the other hand, the 
opposite may happen as well, if an artifact 
changes while its security properties remain 
untouched. In the context of this survey, we 
will consider evolution as changes made to 
an artifact. 
The second dimension, i.e., granularity of 
evolution, has two categories as well, i.e., 
fine-grained evolution and coarse-grained. 
Fine grained evolution is used to cope up 
with changes in systems (for example, new 
or extended functionality). Several general-
purpose evolution specification or model 
transformation approaches exist, for 
instance, (Heckel, 1998; Andries et al., 
1999). Jürjens et al. (2011) discuss the use of 
stereotypes for annotating several future 
change possibilities in UML. The changes 
can be coordinated by constraints in first 
order logic. France & Bieman (2001) discuss 
a multi-view approach supporting cyclic 
evolution of object-oriented UML models. 
Breu et al. (2010) show how state machines 
are defined that control the lifecycle of 
specific model elements where changes to 
the state of a model element may propagate 
further stage changes on other model 
elements with the purpose of coordinating 
the tasks of various stakeholders in the 
maintenance process of complex models. 
Coarse-grained evolution is a similar 
context with a different level of abstraction 
which deals with evolving architectures. 
Garlan et al. (Garlan, Barnes, Schmerl, & 
Celiku, 2009a) discuss different evolution 
styles for high-level architectural views of 
the system. It also discusses the possibility 
of having more than one evolution path and 
describes tool support for choosing the 
“correct” paths with respect to properties 
described in temporal logic. 
In the course of this section we will 
continue by analyzing the current state of the 
art of security engineering using UML 
models in context of the previously defined 
security notions. This is followed by modern 
approaches to include model evolution in 
security considerations. 
 
Security Engineering with UML 
 
Models can be very useful to improve the 
quality of systems at early development 
stages. In particular, security issues 
associated with design can be spotted 
already in models. There exist several lines 
of research towards using UML for security 
systems development discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
UMLsec. UMLsec (Jürjens, 2005) is a 
comprehensive approach covering the 
aforementioned core of UML diagrams with 
respect to different security properties. 
UMLsec is a light-weight extension of UML 
using stereotypes, tags, and constraints, to 
 specify typical security requirements such as 
secrecy, integrity, or authenticity, and 
attacker models. Together with a formal 
semantics for a core of UML, it is possible 
to reason about Dolev-Yao secrecy in 
protocols specified using sequence diagrams 
or information flow in state charts. It 
therefore falls in almost all categories of our 
classification, availability being the less 
studied aspect in the context of UMLsec. 
 
Access Control. Most of the work on 
security and UML focuses on access control 
mechanisms. SecureUML (Basin, Doser, & 
Lodderstedt, 2003; Basin, Doser, & 
Lodderstedt, 2006) shows how UML can be 
used to specify access control in an 
application and how one can then generate 
access control mechanisms from the 
specifications. The approach is based on 
role-based access control and gives 
additional support for specifying 
authorization constraints. Hawkins and 
Fernandez (1997) extend use cases and 
interaction diagrams to support distributed 
system architecture requirements. Brose et 
al. (2002) demonstrate how to deal with 
access control policies in UML. The 
specification of access control policies is 
integrated into UML. A graph-based formal 
semantics for the UML access control 
specification permits one to reason about the 
coherence of the access control 
specification. 
Georg et al. (Georg, France, & Ray, 
2002) demonstrate how to use UML for 
aspect-oriented development of security-
critical systems. Design-level aspects are 
used to encapsulate security concerns that 
can be woven into the models. In Georg et 
al. (2003), authentication mechanism models 
are considered in an abstract aspect model 
and more detailed models are created from 
these. The models can be composed with 
primary decomposition models, allowing 
system architects to analyze different 
mechanisms to realize a particular concern, 
such as authentication. 
Ray et al. (2003) propose to use aspect-
oriented modeling for addressing access 
control concerns. Functionality that 
addresses a pervasive access control concern 
is defined in an aspect. The remaining 
functionality is specified in a so-called 
primary model. Composing access control 
aspects with a primary model then gives a 
system model that addresses access control 
concerns. Kim et al. (2004) use a variant of 
UML to model Role Based Access Control 
and Mandatory Access Control to compose 
access control policy frameworks.  
Alghathbar and Wijesekera (2003) 
suggest a method for specifying access 
control policies with UML use cases and 
propose a methodology to resolve some 
issues of consistency and completeness of 
access control specifications. 
 
Information Flow control. Heldal and 
Hultin (2003) provide support for the use of 
UML with secrecy annotations so that the 
code produced from the UML models can be 
validated by the Java information flow 
language-based checker. Ochoa et al. (2012) 
present an approximation to non-interference 
on UMLsec state charts. Ruhroth and Jürjens 
(2012) present a modular security analysis 
for supporting evolution using UMLsec is 
done based on possibilistic information flow 
properties as defined by Mantel (Mantel, 
2002).  
 
Availability. Availability is among the less 
studied aspects of security in the context of 
UML. Leangsuksun et al (2003) present an 
UML profile for general reliability that 
given specifications of failure rate and repair 
rates for components constructs a statistical 
model to calculate the system’s reliability. 
Similarly Bernardi et al. (2007) describe an 
UML profile for dependability and analysis 
for real-time system. Trujillo et al. (2009) 
propose a UML 2.0 profile to define security 
requirements for Data Warehouses. Salehi et 
  
al. (2010) discuss an UML-based domain 
specific language that allows specifying 
system configurations for an availability 
framework. 
 
Authenticity and Secrecy against man-in-
the-middle attackers. Apart from UMLsec, 
where the analysis of security protocols 
modelled with sequence diagrams plays an 
important role, Moebius et al. (2009) study 
an model-driven development approach for 
smart-cards that also focuses on man-in-the-
middle attackers on the Dolev-Yao symbolic 
model. 
 
Other aspects. Houmb and Hansen (2003) 
present SecurityAssessmentUML, a UML 
profile for security assessments, as well as a 
security assessment process with its 
associated documentation framework. The 
main objective is to support documentation 
of output based on risk identification and 
analysis in a security assessment. Blobel 
(2002) uses UML for modeling security-
critical systems in the health sector. 
 
Security Evolution and UML Models 
 
Changes in models might have a tremendous 
impact on security because newly introduced 
functionality might inadvertently conflict 
with security requirements of the system. On 
the other hand, changes on security policies 
might render formerly secure systems 
insecure. However, to the best of our 
knowledge little research has been done on 
the impact of evolution on the security of 
UML models. In general, there are at least 
two change dimensions that are interesting 
in this context: the evolution of the security 
properties for a fixed model and, vice-versa, 
the evolution of models for fixed security 
properties. On the other hand, there are at 
least two interesting notions of evolution in 
models: incremental changes on models (for 
example adding, removing or substituting 
classes and attributes in class diagrams or 
transitions in state charts) and coarse grained 
changes (addition, deletion and substitution 
of components). 
 
Evolution of access control policies. Role-
based Access Control is one of the most 
studied security mechanisms in the context 
of UML. Montrieux et al. (2011) review the 
state of the art of the evolution of RBAC 
policies which are specified on the basis of 
UML models, and discusses some open 
challenges. On the one hand, it would be 
desirable that when incremental changes are 
made to the specification, an efficient re-
verification of consistency takes place (as 
opposed to a trivial re-checking of the 
complete model). On the other hand, 
merging (composing) two specifications is 
challenging because potential discrepancies 
could have a security impact (for example 
when a role with the same name exists in 
both specifications). Goncalves and 
Poniszewska-Maranda (2008) discuss the 
evolution of role-based access control 
policies and propose an algorithm to detect 
potential inconsistencies when new 
components are added to the system. Koch 
et al. (2001) present algorithms for coping 
with the transformation and integration of 
Labeled Based Access Control (LBAC) and 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
policies specified using graphs. Although 
this formalism is close to UML, to the best 
of our knowledge these results have not been 
used or extended for UML access control 
specifications nor for the more popular 
RBAC policies. 
 
Fine-grained evolution of security 
properties. For models annotated with the 
UMLsec profile, there exists work on 
studying the impact of model change for 
fixed security properties. The UMLseCh 
(Jürjens et al., 2011) approach discusses 
sufficient conditions for the preservation of 
the consistency of selected UMLsec security 
requirements when models are incrementally 
transformed and presents a general strategy 
 for proving soundness of those conditions 
using inductive reasoning. The approach is 
illustrated with the secure dependencies 
stereotype of UMLsec that requires 
consistency of security annotations on 
communicating classes. The efficiency of 
the approach is quantified empirically by 
comparing the running time of the proposed 
methodology against complete re-
verification. This approach is fine-grained 
and focuses on confidentiality and integrity 
requirements for further analysis in the 
context of man-in-the-middle or/and non-
interference. 
 
Coarse-grained evolution of security 
properties. Ochoa et al. (2012) discuss a 
sound decision procedure for the 
compositionality of Dolev-Yao secrecy in 
UMLsec diagrams. Here the behavior is 
specified using sequence diagrams. Ochoa et 
al. (2012) also present a compositionality 
theorem for Non-interference on UMLsec 
state charts that is valid for a particular 
notion of composition (that does not allow 
callbacks). Ruhroth and Jürjens (2012) 
present a modular security analysis for 
supporting evolution using UMLsec is done 
based on possibilistic information flow 
properties as defined by Mantel (2002). 
 
 
Security Requirements Evolution 
 
The need of considering security in the early 
stages of the software development lifecycle 
is well recognized. A major role in 
addressing this need is played by Security 
Requirement Engineering (SRE) which 
comprises processes, techniques and tools to 
elicit, model and analyze security 
requirements. A challenging aspect in the 
security requirement engineering realm is 
evolution. Evolution is the phenomenon 
where changes are introduced in a 
requirement model or specification to 
respond to changes in stakeholders’ needs, in 
the environment where a system operates, or 
because new regulations and standards are 
introduced. 
Much of the existing research has been on 
requirements evolution and analysis of 
security requirements. As such, we organize 
this section accordingly. In the next section, 
we first give a brief overview of the security 
requirements engineering methods existing 
in literature. Then, we discuss the 
approaches related to requirements evolution 
in Section Requirements Evolution. We 
conclude by presenting the works specific to 
security requirements evolution management 
in Section Security Requirements Evolution. 
 
Security Requirements 
 
Several requirements engineering 
approaches have been proposed and they 
have been surveyed in (Nhlabatsi, Nuseibeh, 
& Yu, 2009). We categorize them in goal-
oriented, problem-based and risk-based 
security requirements methods. In addition, 
also classical modeling techniques like UML 
(see Section Security Model Evolution) can 
be applied.  
 
Goal-Oriented SRE Methods. Among goal-
oriented approaches, van Lamsweerde 
extends KAOS by introducing the notions of 
obstacle (Van Lamsweerde & Letier, 2000) 
and anti-goal (van Lamsweerde, 2004) to 
analyze the security concerns of a system. 
Liu et al. (2003) propose an extension of 
the i* framework to identify attackers, and 
analyze vulnerabilities through actors 
dependency links. In this framework, all 
actors are considered as potential attackers, 
and therefore their capabilities are analyzed 
and possible damages caused by actors are 
assessed. Li et al. (Li, Liu, & Bryant, 2010) 
propose a formal framework to support the 
attacker analysis. Similarly, Elahi et al. 
(2009) propose extensions to i* to model and 
analyze the vulnerabilities affecting system 
requirements. Massacci et al. (2010) design 
SI*, a modeling framework extending the i* 
  
framework, which aims at modeling and 
analyzing organizational settings and their 
security and dependability requirements. 
Similarly, Mouratidis et al. (2003) extend 
the Tropos methodology to include security 
related concepts. 
 
Problem-based SRE Methods. Jackson 
(2001) has introduced the notion of Problem 
Frames as a way to describe the structure of 
recurring software problems. Extending this 
framework, there are lines of research that 
examine the security issues at requirements 
level. Abuse Frames (Lin, Nuseibeh, Ince, & 
Jackson, 2004) describe patterns of software 
problems viewed from an attacker’s 
perspective. It describes the attacker’s 
requirement, together with the software and 
the context in which the software might be 
attacked. A central idea in the Problem 
Frames approach is the notion of adequacy 
argument. This is an argument showing, that 
the specification, together with the 
descriptions of the domain properties, 
satisfies the requirement. Haley et al. (2008) 
extend and apply the notion of arguments to 
security requirements. Extending the work 
of Haley et al. (2008), Franqueira et al. 
(2011) suggest that, when it is prohibitive to 
draw on expert knowledge about security 
risks, some of the arguments can be based on 
security catalogues that are publicly 
available. 
 
Risk-Based SRE Methods. Mead et al. 
(2005) propose SQUARE, a Security 
Quality Requirements Engineering 
(SQUARE) Methodology which considers 
security in the early phases of the software 
development lifecycle. The SQUARE 
process consists of nine steps. First, the 
requirements engineering team and project 
stakeholders agree on technical definitions 
that serve as a baseline for all future 
communication. Next, business and security 
goals are outlined. Third, artifacts and 
documentation are created. A risk 
assessment is conducted to determine the 
likelihood and impact of possible threats to 
the system. Then, the requirements 
engineering team selects a method for 
eliciting an initial set of security 
requirements, which are then categorized 
and prioritized. Finally, an inspection stage 
is included to ensure the consistency and 
accuracy of the security requirements that 
have been generated. A similar process to 
elicit security requirements has been 
proposed by Mellado et al. (2008). The 
authors introduce the Security Requirements 
Engineering Process (SREP), which is an 
asset-based and risk-driven security 
requirements engineering method.  
 
Requirements Evolution 
 
Recent works on requirements evolution aim 
at understanding the nature of the problem 
and to model it, or focus on methods and 
tools to assess and manage the impact of 
change. 
As a way to understand how requirements 
evolve, research in the PROTEUS project 
(Project PROTEUS, 1996) classifies 
requirements into stable and changing, and 
further refines changing requirements into 
five types, which are related to the 
development environment, stakeholder, 
development processes, requirement 
understanding and requirement relation. In 
addition, the project proposes a formal 
representation for requirements evolution 
that is based on goal-structure framework. 
Later, Lam and Loomes (1998) present the 
EVE framework which supports a meta-
model for requirements evolution. Other 
notable approaches include (Brier, 
Rapanotti, & Hall, 2006; Felici, 2004; Stark, 
Oman, Skillicorn, & Ameele, 1999). Brier et 
al. (2006) propose a problem frames based 
approach to help in the analysis of changes 
which impact an organization, in the 
identification and codification of recurrent 
change scenarios, and in the application of 
codified wisdom to new change problems. 
Felici et al. (2004) empirically investigate 
 the requirements evolution problem by 
conducting two case studies on avionics 
systems and smart cards. Stark et al. (Stark 
et al., 1999) study how change occurs in the 
software system and attempt to produce a 
prediction model of changes. 
 
Inconsistencies Checking. Zowghi and 
Offen (1997) work at meta-level logic to 
capture intuitive aspects of managing 
changes to requirement models. Their 
approach is based on theory construction, 
which commences with the development of 
a requirements model seen as a theory of 
some non-monotonic logic. Requirements 
evolution then involves the mapping of one 
such theory to another. Exploiting the 
deductive power of the theory of belief, 
revision and non-monotonic reasoning, the 
authors develop a formal description of this 
mapping, as well as the requirements 
engineering process. Russo et al. (1999) 
propose an analysis and revision approach to 
restructure requirements to detect 
inconsistency and manage changes. The 
main idea is to allow evolutionary changes 
to occur first and then, in the next step, 
verify their impact on requirement 
satisfaction. Based on the same idea, d’Avila 
Garcez et al. (2003) target the preservation 
of goals and requirements during evolution. 
They propose an analysis which checks if a 
specification satisfies a given requirement. If 
it does not, diagnosis information is 
generated to guide the modification of 
specification in order to satisfy the 
requirement. Similar to d’Avila Garcez et 
al., Ghose’s framework (Ghose, 1999) 
proposes an approach for handling 
inconsistencies due to the introduction of 
new requirements. The approach is based on 
formal default reasoning and belief revision, 
and it is tool supported (Ghose, 2000). 
Another work related to inconsistencies 
handling, is the one by Fabbrinni et al. 
(2007). They deal with controlling 
consistency requirements evolution 
expressed in natural language based on 
formal concept analysis. 
 
Change Impact Analysis. Other approaches 
focus on analyzing the impact of 
requirements evolution. Chechik et al. 
(2009) propose a model-based approach to 
propagate changes between requirements 
and design models that utilize the 
relationship between the models to 
automatically propagate changes. Hassine et 
al. (2005) present an approach to change 
impact analysis that applies both slicing and 
dependency analysis at the Use Case Map 
specification level to identify the potential 
impact of requirement changes on the 
overall system. Lin et al. (2009) propose 
capturing requirement changes as a series of 
atomic changes in specifications and using 
algorithms to relate changes in requirements 
to corresponding changes in specifications. 
Label propagation has been used in goal-
oriented requirements engineering to handle 
change (Giorgini, Massacci, & Zannone, 
2005). 
 
Evolution Management. In addition to the 
approaches mentioned before, there exists a 
number of approaches aiming to identify 
optimal design solutions to support 
requirements evolution (Bryl, Giorgini, & 
Mylopoulos, 2009; Heaven & Letier, 2011; 
Souza, Lapouchnian, & Mylopoulos, 2011; 
Tran & Massacci, 2011; Ernst, Borgida, & 
Jureta, 2011; Letier & van Lamsweerde, 
2004). These approaches address 
requirements evolution using adaptation or 
mutation mechanisms. The adaptation 
mechanism refers to the case that system 
changes its behavior at runtime in order to 
continue to meet its requirements in 
response to feedback. The success (or 
failure) of a behavior depends on control 
variables and indicators. The former 
determine respective resource allocation for 
fulfilling requirements and the latter measure 
the quality of satisfaction or performance. 
As result, it raises a problem, namely 
Control Variables and Indicators (CV&I), 
  
that consists of finding a design solution that 
is good enough with respect to one or 
multiple indicators. Studies in this realm 
include (Bryl et al., 2009; Heaven & Letier, 
2011; Souza et al., 2011). Bryl et al. (2009) 
propose an approach that generates and 
evaluates multiple requirement models that 
can meet the stakeholders’ desire to find a 
right trade-off between the technical and 
social dimensions. Letier et al. (2004) 
develop the quantitative goal model that 
extends the KAOS (van Lamsweerde, 2009) 
framework by annotating goals with 
quantitative attributes. On this basis, the 
same authors (Heaven & Letier, 2011) 
developed techniques that automate the 
evaluation of requirements satisfaction of 
different alternative system designs in 
quantitative goal models. In another work, 
Souza et al. (2011) propose a systematic 
system identification method for adaptive 
software system. In this approach, the 
dynamic behavior of the system is governed 
by a set of (in)equations, called qualitative 
differential constraints. 
The mutation mechanism is the case that 
the system changes in response to changes to 
its requirements. At runtime, the 
requirements of a system might change and 
some old requirements are obsolete. 
Mutation thus comprises two classes of 
requirements changes: known unknown and 
unknown. The known unknown class 
includes changes that are anticipated (the 
known), but it is not sure whether these 
changes will actually happen (the unknown). 
Tran and Massacci (Tran & Massacci, 2011) 
proposed an approach to handle known 
unknown changes. The approach captures 
requirements evolution in terms of evolution 
rules, including controllable evolution rule 
and observable evolution rule. The approach 
also supports a reasoning to measure the 
level of usefulness of different design 
solutions based on two metrics, i.e., 
MaxBelief and ResidualRisk. MaxBelief 
measures the maximum evolution 
probability that a solution is still useful after 
evolution occurs. ResidualRisk is the 
probability that a solution becomes useless 
after evolution. Ernst et al. (2011) instead 
propose an approach to handle unknown 
changes, that are unanticipated changes and, 
thus, they cannot be modeled. They present 
algorithms to find new solutions that use as 
much as possible of the old solution (i.e., 
maximize familiarity), and minimize the 
number of tasks that need to be implemented 
(i.e., minimize effort). 
 
Security Requirements Evolution 
 
The issue of maintaining security while 
introducing changes to a requirements model 
or specification has not been extensively 
studied. The only work we are aware of that 
investigates this problem, is Bergmann et al. 
(2011), which presents the SecureChange 
Methodology for Evolutionary Requirements 
(SeCMER), a model driven engineering 
methodology to represent, analyze and 
detect security issues that arise because of 
requirements’ evolution. The core features 
of the methodology are: 
• a conceptual model for evolving 
security requirements (Massacci, 
Mylopoulos, Paci, Tun, & Yu, 2011), 
• a pattern-based analysis to automatically 
detect changes in a requirement model 
that lead to a violation of security 
principles, e.g., least privilege and need 
to know, and 
• argumentation-based analysis to assess 
the impact of changes to security. 
 
The conceptual model allows explicitly 
linking security knowledge such as assets 
and threats to stakeholders’ security goals. 
The pattern-based analysis for automatic 
security requirements change detection is 
built upon EMFIncQuery (Bergmann, 
Ujhelyi, Rath, & Varro, 2011) which is a 
framework with a language for defining 
declarative local and global queries over 
Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) 
models, and a runtime engine for executing 
 the queries efficiently. The analysis is based 
on the specification of a security property as 
a pattern in the EMF-IncQuery language 
where the pattern defines a set of constraints 
on requirements model elements. If as a 
consequence of the introduction of a 
change(s) in the requirement model the 
pattern disappears, EMF-IncQuery engine 
notes the violation of the security property 
represented by the pattern and suggests 
corrective actions to solve the security issue. 
Argumentation analysis complements the 
automatic pattern-based analysis in that it 
checks whether there are new security 
properties to be added or to be removed (∆ 
Security Properties) as a result of changes in 
the requirement model. The execution of the 
steps of the methodology is tool-supported 
(Bergmann et al., 2011). 
 
 
Security Architecture Evolution 
 
Software architecture is critical to secure and 
evolve a system, because it inhibits or 
enables the system’s quality attributes 
(including modifiability and security) and 
makes it easier to reason about and manage 
change (Bass, Clements, & Kazman, 2003). 
Architectural decisions are crucial for the 
security of the system, as security flaws at 
the architectural level are hard or even 
impossible to fix afterwards without 
changing the architecture, which can be a 
very costly operation. Despite the 
importance of understanding the impact of 
evolution on security at the architectural 
level, however, it appears that research in 
this area is scarce. 
The architecture of a system should 
attempt to ensure the security of that system 
when it is first deployed. As it will then 
evolve together with the system, it should be 
constructed with future evolution paths in 
mind. Hence, to guarantee the security of the 
system over time, the architecture of the 
system should allow future security-related 
modifications to be performed with a low 
impact. For example, it may be necessary to 
upgrade the used security mechanisms, such 
as cryptographic protocols, or to install a 
secure link between two different parts of 
the system. 
 
Software Architecture 
 
Various definitions of software architecture 
have been proposed by different authors 
(Rozanski & Woods, 2005; Taylor, 
Medividovic, & Dashofy, 2010). Software 
Architecture can be defiend as a collection 
of elements (processing, data or connecting 
elements), their relationships, and some 
degree of rationale (Rozanski & Woods, 
2005; Taylor, Medividovic, & Dashofy, 
2010). 
There are many different ways to 
interpret an element, which can be captured 
in the notion of an architectural style. 
Rozanski and Woods (2005) state the 
following: “An architectural style expresses 
a fundamental structural organization 
schema for software systems. It provides a 
set of predefined element types, specifies 
their responsibilities, and includes rules and 
guidelines for organizing the relationships 
between them”. A style thus defines the 
vocabulary and rules that can be used to 
define an architecture conforming to that 
style. A somewhat different definition of 
software architecture is given by Klusener et 
al. (2005): “The software architecture of 
deployed software is determined by those 
aspects that are the hardest to change”. The 
attribute driven design (ADD) process (Bass 
et al. 2003) reflects this as well. It is based 
on the premise that the main drivers for an 
architecture are the system’s quality 
attributes (non-functional requirements), 
including modifiability and security. It 
prescribes to develop the system based on 
these quality attributes, such that that the 
most important qualities of the system are 
certainly fulfilled. Of course, this also 
implies that the decisions regarding these 
  
qualities are the hardest to change 
afterwards, and appropriate care must be 
taken to include them right from the 
beginning. 
 
Security and Software Architecture 
 
Books on software architecture generally 
include some general advice related to 
security. For example, Rozanski and Woods 
(2005) define a security perspective, which 
presents security-oriented architectural 
concerns, activities, tactics, problems and 
pitfalls, and checklists. Taylor et al. (2010) 
discuss secure design principles, access 
control and trust management. Bass et al. 
(2003) provide general security tactics that 
can be used. The tactics are categorized as 
tactics for resisting attacks, detecting attacks, 
or recovering from an attack. When going 
beyond the general advice, security at the 
architectural level can be looked at from 
different viewpoints. From a constructive 
viewpoint, the question that has to be 
answered is how to create an architecture 
that has certain security qualities. Work in 
this area is mainly concerned with 
techniques, processes and guidelines to setup 
a secure software architecture. On the other 
hand, from the modeling viewpoint, security 
aspects of an architecture have to be 
expressed and documented, so that they can 
be stored and communicated. Finally, from 
the analysis viewpoint, it can be investigated 
what security analyses can be performed 
based on some architectural model. Note that 
these viewpoints are not strictly separated; 
for instance, analysis techniques will often 
depend on specific model types, and models 
are usually constructed with the help of 
constructive guidance. The following 
paragraphs provide some references to work 
in each of these three areas. 
 
Constructive viewpoint. We believe that the 
most important aspect in the constructive 
viewpoint is the transition from the security 
requirements to the architectural design. 
Security requirements can be captured in a 
variety of ways, as demonstrated in Section 
Security Requirements Evolution. An 
example approach to connect these two 
artifacts is given by Mouratidis and Jürjens 
(2010), who describe how to integrate 
Secure Tropos (one of the goal-oriented 
security requirements engineering 
methodologies) with UMLSec (see Section 
Security Engineering with UML), in order to 
assist software engineers with deriving a 
secure design from security requirements. 
Often, security patterns (Yoshioka, 
Washizaki, & Maruyama, 2008; Hafiz, 
Adamczyk, & Johnson, 2007) are advocated 
as a means to construct secure software. 
Such patterns capture recurrent solutions for 
specific problems, such that they can easily 
be reused by others. They can be structured 
and categorized to assist the architect in 
picking a suitable pattern (Hafiz et al., 2007; 
Yskout, Scandariato, & Joosen, 2012b). For 
instance, in the NFR framework, patterns are 
used to create secure designs (Weiss, 2007). 
Van Lamsweerde (2003) also proposes a 
pattern-based refinement approach for 
creating architectures from KAOS 
requirements models, including examples for 
security as a non-functional goal. More 
recently, another approach using patterns 
was proposed by Alebrahim et al. (2011). 
This approach starts from Problem Frames 
models, and also takes non-functional 
requirements (in particular, security and 
performance) into account. Nhlabatsi et al. 
(2010) have reviewed and compared 
multiple approaches for bringing 
architectural security patterns closer to the 
requirements engineering space, to reduce 
the gap between these two areas. 
Besides patterns, security design 
principles are also commonly used as 
guidance for creating secure software. 
Taylor et al. (2010) highlight some 
principles that are particularly well-suited 
for architectural design, for example the 
principle of least privilege, complete 
mediation or defense in depth. 
  
Modeling viewpoint. Despite the importance 
of architecture for security, little work exists 
that specifically aims at modeling security at 
the architectural level. Some existing 
architectural description languages (ADLs) 
have been extended to support security. For 
instance, Secure xADL (Ren & Taylor, 
2005) enriches the xADL language with 
concepts for access control. Security-specific 
extensions to Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) 
have also been proposed (Abi-Antoun, 
Wang, & Torr, 2007). UML, when 
considered as an ADL, may also be used or 
extended to represent security properties. 
We refer to Section Security Engineering 
with UML for a discussion of the usage of 
UML for security. 
 
Security analysis viewpoint. Besides 
providing security-specific notations, 
UMLsec can also be used to perform a 
formal analysis on the design. The STRIDE 
(Hernan, Lambert, Ostwald, & Shostack, 
2006) risk analysis method is performed 
using an architectural description (i.e., a data 
flow diagram) as input. Measuring the 
security of a design can be done using 
security metrics. For instance, an attack 
surface metric (Manadhata & Wing, 2011) 
can be used to estimate the security of a 
design, and subsequently improve it. 
Additionally, adherence to security 
principles can be analyzed at the 
architectural level. For example, analysis 
techniques exist to detect violations of the 
least privilege principle (Scandariato, 
Buyens, & Joosen, 2010). For more 
background on analysis techniques, we refer 
to the survey by Dai and Cooper (2007). 
 
Software Architecture Evolution 
 
Evolution of a system’s architecture 
originates from a change in the requirements 
of the system, or a change in the 
assumptions and constraints regarding the 
systems environment. Therefore, as before, 
it is important to relate evolution at the 
requirements level to architectural evolution. 
Also, the impact of a change at the 
architectural level must be assessed. Of 
course, changes to the architecture of a 
system are not isolated and need to be 
propagated further to other development 
artifacts (Mens, Magee, & Rumpe, 2010). 
A systematic literature review of software 
architecture evolution has been performed 
by Breivold et al. (2012), to which we refer 
for a comprehensive overview of this 
research area. In this section, rather than 
aiming at completeness, we give some 
illustrative and additional references 
concerning evolution at the architectural 
level from the constructive, modeling and 
analysis viewpoint, in an attempt to provide 
an indication of this topic’s extent. 
 
Constructive viewpoint. As before, the reuse 
of known solutions (for example, in the form 
of patterns, tactics, or guidelines) is a 
popular technique used by software 
architects to achieve a modifiable system, 
i.e., a system in which the impact of possible 
changes is reduced. For example, Bass, 
Clements and Kazman (2003) provide a set 
of modifiability tactics. These tactics are 
divided in three groups: The first set of 
tactics aims to localize modifications, for 
instance by maintaining semantic coherence 
or anticipating expected changes. The 
second set prevents ripple effects, for 
instance by hiding information 
(encapsulation), maintaining existing 
interfaces, or adding intermediaries. The 
third set contains tactics to defer binding 
time, for example by making use of 
configuration files or polymorphism. By 
applying these tactics at the right places in 
the architecture, the architect creates a 
system that can be modified with low 
architectural impact. 
To ease the transition from requirements 
to architecture, Côté et al. (2007) describe an 
informal approach based on problem frames, 
  
a requirements engineering methodology. 
Architectural patterns are assumed to be 
associated to corresponding problem frames 
via traceability links. In light of evolution, 
new sub-frames may emerge in the 
specification and the architect can extend the 
design by incorporating additional 
architectural patterns, whose selection is 
facilitated by the traceability links. 
Change patterns (Yskout, Scandariato, & 
Joosen, 2012a) precisely capture a generic 
change at the requirements level and 
associate this change with a set of 
architectural solutions. A solution provides a 
generic template, which needs to be 
instantiated in the architecture, and a 
transformation based on this template that 
evolves the architecture in accordance with 
the change at the requirements level. These 
patterns thus assist the architect in both 
preparing and executing change. They can 
also be used to propagate changes from the 
security requirements, via the software 
architecture, to the running system through 
runtime reconfiguration (Yskout, Ben David, 
Scandariato, & Baudry, 2012).  
Ahmad et al. (2012) propose a technique 
for analyzing the history of changes in 
service based software architectures. The 
changes are captured in the form of patterns, 
which are also called change patterns. These 
patterns can then be queried and reused 
when change scenarios are executed. 
To guide the gradual transition from one 
architecture to another, Garlan et al. (Garlan, 
Barnes, Schmerl, & Celiku, 2009b) propose 
the concept of ‘evolution styles’. An 
evolution style is a pattern that can be used 
by the architect to plan incremental 
evolution paths (orthogonal to the evolution 
of functional requirements) from an initial 
architecture to some target architecture. For 
example, the evolution style that is used to 
illustrate the approach describes the 
transition from an ad hoc, peer-to-peer 
architecture to a hub-and-spoke architecture. 
The style characterizes the intermediate 
versions of the architecture and a set of 
operations to assist the architect with 
evolving from one version to another while 
making trade-offs. Furthermore, properties 
and constraints can be added to the path of 
evolution, in order to perform analyzes, 
trade-offs or correctness checks. 
 
Modeling viewpoint. The use of graph 
transformations has been proposed to model 
architectural evolution. For example, 
Tamzalit and Mens (2010) describe how 
they can be used to describe architectural 
restructuring. In particular, the approach is 
tailored for defining generic restructurings 
that introduce an architectural style. The 
approach starts from defining an 
Architectural Description Language (ADL) 
as a type graph, coupled with a set of 
invariants (constraints). A concrete 
architectural description is then a graph that 
conforms to the ADL’s type graph. 
Similarly, architectural styles are modeled as 
type graphs that extend the type graph of the 
ADL. A set of graph transformation rules 
formalizes the process of transforming an 
architecture to a new one that conforms to a 
certain architectural style, for example a 
client-server style. This process (i.e., a 
sequence of rules) is called an evolution 
pattern. Through Critical Pair Analysis 
(CPA), conflicts and dependencies between 
the individual rules can be detected 
automatically. 
Barais (2008) studies the support of 
existing approaches to evolving software 
architecture based on the separation of 
concerns principle. It is argued that 
traditional ADLs do not sufficiently support 
separation of concerns, for instance for 
crosscutting concerns such as security. As an 
alternative, the TranSAT framework is 
presented, which considers architectural 
evolution from an aspect-oriented angle. In 
this framework, evolution is achieved by 
weaving a new concern (the ‘architectural 
aspect’) into an existing architecture (the 
‘base plan’). The architectural aspect 
consists of three parts, specified using the 
 TranSAT transformation language: (1) a 
plan, which captures the structure and 
behavior that needs to be injected; (2) a join 
point mask, which defines the necessary 
preconditions on the base plan before the 
plan can be injected; and (3) a set of 
transformation rules, which specify how the 
plan needs to be injected. Analysis is 
supported by static and dynamic checks that 
can be performed to ensure that the injection 
results in a valid software architecture. 
To support architectural practice, 
Razavian and Lago (2012) define a 
viewpoint specifically for representing and 
reasoning about architectural change. The 
viewpoint is based on the mental model that 
the researchers have identified by observing 
how architects deal with change in a case 
study. Briefly, architects appear to focus on 
one source of change at a time, find the 
elements that are influenced by that source, 
and then perform the actual change. The 
proposed viewpoint can be used to model the 
necessary traceability paths that support this 
manner of working. 
A similar approach is proposed by Szlenk 
et al. (2012), who present a model and 
graphical notation for modeling architectural 
decisions (MAD) that can be used to deal 
with change at the architectural level. 
Architectural decisions are modeled using a 
graph, where an edge denotes a ‘leads to’-
relationship from one decision to another 
one. Using this model, changing an earlier 
decision (due to a changed requirement, for 
instance) identifies which other decisions 
may need to be re-examined, and which can 
be left as is. McVeigh (2009) formally 
defines a component based architectural 
description language (Backbone) that 
supports extensibility, together with a 
runtime environment and a modeling tool 
(Evolve). In the Backbone ADL, changes are 
not made by directly modifying the structure 
of the system, but rather by explicitly 
specifying the differences. Backbone is built 
on three concepts to achieve extensibility, 
namely resemblance (defining a new 
component as a set of deltas from an existing 
one), replacement (globally replacing one 
component with another), and strata 
(modules which can group definitions and 
declare dependencies). 
 
Analysis viewpoint. An important set of 
techniques for software architecture analysis 
related to evolution are directed towards 
conducting a modifiability analysis. Such an 
analysis attempts to assess the impact of a 
certain evolution scenario on the system’s 
architecture. It has various applications, for 
example reducing future maintenance effort, 
comparing multiple alternatives to determine 
which one will be cheaper in the long term, 
or performing risk assessments. 
Bengtsson et al. (2004) present the 
architecture-level modifiability analysis 
(ALMA) process. The method can be used 
to perform a modifiability analysis of a 
software architecture with respect to changes 
in the environment, changes in the 
requirements and changes in the functional 
specification The process consists of five 
steps, namely (1) setting the goal of the 
analysis; (2) describing the software 
architecture; (3) elicit change scenarios and 
classify and select them (using a top-down 
approach, starting from a classification, or a 
bottom-up approach, starting from change 
scenarios); (4) evaluate the effect of the 
change scenarios; and (5) interpret the 
results. It has been applied to three case 
studies, each demonstrating another analysis 
goal, namely the predicton of maintenance 
effort, the assessment of risks due to 
inflexibility, or the comparison of 
architectural alternatives. 
Breivold et al. (2012) proposes another 
process, AREA, which includes both a 
qualitative and quantitative method for 
assessing the evolvability of a software 
architecture. Furthermore, they define a 
software evolvability model, which 
identifies important sub-characteristics of 
software evolution such as changeability, 
extensibility and portability that should be 
  
taken into account by practitioners. Their 
techniques have also been evaluated using 
two industrial case studies. 
On a more fundamental level, Williams 
and Carver (2010) define the Software 
Architecture Change Characterization 
Scheme (SACCS). This scheme is based on 
an extensive literature review and aims at 
providing insight into the architectural 
change process. The impact of a change is 
assessed using different criteria, such as the 
motivation, importance, or granularity of the 
change. In the future, this framework may 
result in the creation of a change decision 
support system that can be used by architects 
to predict the difficulty of a change. 
Khan et al. (2008) explicitly acknowledge 
the relationship of requirements to 
architectural elements by means of 
dependencies. In the context of evolution, 
they first identify six relevant categories of 
dependencies, i.e., (1) goal dependencies, 
which relate the quality requirements to 
architectural elements; (2) service 
dependencies, which relate functional 
requirements to operations at the 
architectural level; (3) conditional 
dependencies from requirements specifying 
triggering events and conditions to the 
architectural elements realizing them; (4) 
temporal dependencies, relating 
requirements on the time frame of events or 
processes to their realization; (5) task 
dependencies, connecting user input or 
feedback to the architecture; and (6) 
infrastructure dependencies, relating 
requirements on resources, networks, 
technical details etc. to the architecture. 
Furthermore, they have assessed the impact 
on the architecture of changes that belong to 
these categories. 
 
Secure Software Architecture Evolution 
 
As mentioned at the start of this section, 
little work exists in the intersection of the 
secure software engineering and 
architectural evolution areas. Therefore, this 
area lends itself well to further research. 
Section Security Evolution and UML Models 
already provides an overview of security 
evolution and UML models, which is 
certainly relevant for the software 
architecture domain as well. Furthermore, it 
would be worthwhile to analyze concrete 
security-related architectural changes, in 
order to elicit patterns or best practices to 
securely evolve a system. Hafiz and Johnson 
(2008) provide a first contribution in this 
respect, by describing the evolution of Mail 
Transfer Agent architectures. These systems 
were confronted with progressively more 
demanding security requirements due to 
their rising popularity. The authors show 
how early architectural decisions impact the 
security of the system over time and how 
some architectural choices lead to a more 
secure system than others. Additionally, it 
would be valuable to investigate how 
existing techniques for architectural 
evolution support security. For example, the 
change patterns approach mentioned before 
(Yskout, Scandariato, & Joosen, 2012a) is 
illustrated with a catalog of patterns for 
changing trust assumptions forming an 
important class of security-related changes. 
 
 
Secure Code Evolution 
 
Source code is the central artifact of any 
software system. It also reflects many of the 
properties of other artifacts. The architecture 
of a software system is reflected in the 
source code, and a well-designed 
architecture will make it easy to evolve the 
source code in specific directions. If security 
goals have been elicited well during 
requirements engineering, the source code is 
more likely to implement appropriate 
protection measures for all relevant assets. 
And well-tested code is likely to have fewer 
bugs and vulnerabilities than untested code. 
Yet, the coding phase itself introduces its 
own set of potential problems and pitfalls, 
 and in this section we focus on these purely 
implementation-level aspects of security and 
evolution. 
 
Source Code  
 
Source code is written in a programming 
language and the choice of programming 
language potentially has a significant impact 
on the security and evolvability of code. 
A first key property of the programming 
language that affects security is safety. A 
safe programming language ensures that 
programs always have a well-defined 
behavior, i.e., they leave no cases where 
behavior of a program is undefined (Pierce, 
2002). In contrast, unsafe languages such as 
C or C++ may leave the behavior of 
programs unspecified in some cases, and 
assume that the programmer takes the 
necessary measures to avoid such cases. Safe 
languages are important for secure code 
evolution since they guarantee the absence 
of certain classes of security bugs (e.g., 
buffer overflows). 
The most common ways to achieve safety 
are through static typing or through dynamic 
typing (Cardelli, 1997). Dynamically typed 
languages such as JavaScript or Python 
perform type checks during the execution of 
the program and report an error when an 
operation is executed on the wrong type. 
Statically typed languages such as Java or 
ML avoid as many runtime checks as 
possible by using a static analysis during 
compilation. At the expense of additional 
type annotations, statically typed languages 
guarantee that all referenced methods and 
operations are defined for the given 
argument types. Showing that the type 
system indeed guarantees safety is done by 
means of a type soundness proof (Pierce, 
2002). Dynamically typed languages often 
have rich reflective capacities that allow 
adding new code or transforming existing 
code at runtime. While this is beneficial for 
runtime code evolution, it also allows 
breaking the invariants of other modules 
which is detrimental for secure code 
evolution. 
A second key property of a programming 
language that affects secure evolution is its 
support for modules and modularity. 
Roughly speaking a module is a blob of code 
that has an interface and an implementation 
(Sullivan, Griswold, Cai, & Hallen, 2001). 
Code is modular, if the correctness of a 
module only depends on the interfaces of the 
modules it depends on.  
Modules can exist at widely varying 
levels of granularity. In mainstream object-
oriented languages, it is common to 
decompose a program into packages 
consisting of classes, which again sprout 
methods. Packages, classes and methods can 
all be considered modules. Aspect-oriented 
programming provides even more advanced 
modularization mechanisms. Aspects 
support the implementation of crosscutting 
concerns in separate modules, which are 
then weaved together with the base program. 
This has an important positive impact on 
evolvability and security (De Win, Joosen, 
& Piessens, 2004). 
Once the programming language is fixed, 
there are still an infinite number of ways to 
implement the same functionality, and some 
of these implementations will be better 
(from the point of view of security and/or 
from the point of view of evolution) than 
others. The most common approach to steer 
programmers to “good” implementations is 
the use of coding principles and guidelines 
(M. Howard & Leblanc, 2001). 
One of the important guidelines for the 
design of software is the concept of 
information hiding (Parnas, 1972), which 
means that the internal implementation of a 
module should be hidden to the clients of 
that module. As a result, the implementation 
of that module can evolve without requiring 
changes to the clients. Furthermore, low 
coupling and high cohesion (Stevens, Myers, 
& Constantine, 1974) are two important 
principles to evaluate the design of systems. 
On the one hand, modules should have as 
  
little dependencies on each other as possible. 
On the other hand, the responsibilities of 
each module should be logically coherent. 
 
Secure Coding 
 
Vulnerabilities that are introduced during the 
implementation phase are essentially coding 
bugs with security consequences 
(exploitable coding bugs). Well-known 
examples of such implementation-level 
vulnerabilities include buffer overflows 
(Erlingsson, Younan, & Piessens, 2010), and 
command injection attacks such as SQL 
injection (Halfond, Viegas, & Orso, 2006) or 
cross-site scripting (XSS) (Johns, 2008). 
Because a wide range of such bugs exists, a 
significant amount of research has been 
conducted regarding their classification. 
Three important scopes that have been 
studied intensively are: 
1. Vulnerabilities in infrastructural 
software such as operating systems, web 
servers or application servers. If an 
attacker can penetrate the runtime 
infrastructure on which an application is 
running, he can also easily penetrate the 
application itself. Since vulnerabilities 
in infrastructural software were the main 
cause of security incidents in the 
seventies, eighties and early nineties, 
many of the early classifications and 
taxonomies focused on operating system 
vulnerabilities (Abbott et al., 1976). In 
the early nineties, Landwehr et al. 
(1994) published a catalog of 50 actual 
flaws, and proposed a taxonomy for 
them. 
2. Vulnerabilities in security components. 
If a security component is implemented 
incorrectly, the protection it provides 
can be bypassed by attackers. Well-
known papers analyzing vulnerabilities 
in cryptographic components (both 
primitives and protocols) are the papers 
by Anderson (1993) or Ferguson and 
Schneier (2003). 
3. Vulnerabilities in applications. As the 
importance of application-level 
vulnerabilities increases, the systematic 
study of these vulnerabilities has 
attracted more attention. Both academia 
(Wang & Wang, 2003), as well as 
industry (MITRE, n.d.; The Open Web 
Application Security Project, 2011) 
have investigated suitable taxonomies 
for application level security flaws. 
While academic work is typically more 
analytical, and looks for sound scientific 
grounds for taxonomies, the work from 
industry is more pragmatic, and its 
primary aim is to come up with useful 
taxonomies to help building and 
comparing tools that scan for 
vulnerabilities. Some classifications, 
such as the OWASP Top 10, even have 
as primary goal to raise awareness 
among developers. The most systematic 
approach appears to be CWE, the 
Common Weaknesses Enumeration 
(MITRE, n.d.), and a formal list of types 
of software weaknesses. It is intended to 
unify the jargon on vulnerabilities, and 
to provide a way to measure 
effectiveness of vulnerability scanning 
tools.  
 
Countermeasures against code-level 
vulnerabilities can also take many forms. 
They range from improvements in 
programming language and type system 
design, over static verification techniques, 
coding guidelines or runtime monitoring of 
the code. 
As discussed above, safety is an 
important security-related property of a 
programming language. Dealing with the 
security consequences of non-safety of 
programming languages, and more 
specifically dealing with the non-safety of C 
and C++ is a very important research area in 
itself, and good surveys of countermeasures 
exist (Younan, Joosen, & Piessens, 2012). 
Hence, we do not discuss these further in 
this article. 
Language-based security (F. Schneider, 
 Morrisett, & Harper, 2001) for safe 
programming languages has become an 
important area of research over the past 
years. Broadly speaking, language-based 
security uses tools and techniques from the 
programming languages research community 
to address security-related issues. Many 
important results have been achieved. 
Schneider, Morrisett, Hamlen and others (F. 
Schneider et al., 2001; Hamlen, Morrisett, & 
Schneider, 2006) have provided a broad and 
widely accepted definition of security 
policies for programs, and have investigated 
what classes of policies can be enforced with 
what kind of enforcement technologies. 
For access control policies, the most 
widely studied enforcement technology is 
execution monitoring. Several projects, e.g., 
(Erlingsson & Schneider, 2000), have built 
execution monitors that can enforce 
configurable and expressive policies. More 
powerful than execution monitoring are 
approaches that can change the flow of 
events generated by a program. Edit 
automata (Ligatti, Bauer, & Walker, 2005) 
enhance security automata with the ability to 
replace, delete or insert program actions. 
The Polymer system (Bauer, Ligatti, & 
Walker, 2005) is a Java-based 
implementation of edit automata.  
Precise enforcement of certain security 
policies (for instance, information flow 
policies) is impossible using only execution 
monitoring, as these policies describe 
properties of sets of executions instead of 
single executions. For such policies, static 
verification is an important enforcement 
technology. Static verification usually relies 
on program annotations, for instance, typing 
information, or specification annotations. 
Checking of information flow policies 
through static verification is a very rich and 
active research field. A survey of results is 
given by Myers and Sabelfeld (2003). 
Very recently, more intricate dynamic 
techniques such as secure multi-execution 
(Devriese & Piessens, 2010) and faceted 
evaluation (Austin & Flanagan, 2012) have 
been developed that support the dynamic 
enforcement of information flow policies, 
albeit at a non-negligible performance cost 
(De Groef, Devriese, Nikiforakis, & 
Piessens, 2012).  
An interesting line of research has shown 
that certain classes of vulnerabilities can be 
addressed by imposing a programming 
model on developers. A programming model 
can be thought of as a formally specified set 
of coding guidelines that can be checked 
statically or dynamically and that provides 
specific formal security guarantees. Example 
programming models deal with concurrency 
related vulnerabilities (e.g., race conditions) 
(Jacobs, Leino, Piessens, & Schulte, 2005), 
with code access security related bugs 
(Smans, Jacobs, & Piessens, 2006) and with 
vulnerabilities related to forceful browsing 
(Desmet, Piessens, Joosen, & Verbaeten, 
2006). Pluggable type systems (Andreae, 
Noble, Markstrum, & Millstein, 2006) 
operate in a similar way.  
On the more pragmatic side, a variety of 
tools exists, that uses heuristics-based static 
analysis to detect security vulnerabilities. 
Well-known tools include FlawFinder 
(Wheeler, n.d.), FindBugs (FindBugs, n.d.), 
and so forth. They usually detect suspicious 
syntactical patterns in the program being 
analyzed. Some of these tools are user-
extensible: new rules to detect vulnerabilities 
can be programmed into the tool. 
 
Code Evolution 
 
The key property to support evolution of 
source code is modularity. Modularity 
supports evolution in different ways. First, 
since other modules depend only on the 
interface of a given module, 
implementation-details of that module can 
be changed without impacting these other 
modules. This supports local updating and 
bug-fixing of code while making sure that 
the impact of such a change remains 
confined to a single module. Second, at a 
more coarse-granular scale, the modular 
  
construction of an application supports the 
relatively flexible addition, removal, 
modification or re-composition of modules 
in the style of component-based 
development (Szyperski, 1998). 
Of course, an important concern is 
whether modular reasoning about source 
code properties is sound in general. How can 
one be sure that the correctness of a 
particular module indeed only depends on 
the interfaces of other modules? If certain 
correctness properties (including also 
security properties) depend on 
implementation details of other modules, 
then a local change in one module can break 
properties of another module. Modular 
reasoning about imperative code turns out to 
be challenging, as all modules have side-
effects to a single program heap. 
An important breakthrough in the past 
decade has been the development of 
separation-logic (Reynolds, 2002) and other 
related program logics (Kassios, 2006; 
Smans, Jacobs, & Piessens, 2009) for 
reasoning about imperative code. Several 
mature tools exist (Jacobs, Smans, & 
Piessens, 2010; Cohen et al., 2009) that can 
verify correctness properties of non-trivial 
code bases (Penninckx, Mühlberg, Smans, 
Jacobs, & Piessens, 2012) in a modular way, 
albeit at the cost of a substantial additional 
effort from the developer. These program 
logics force developers to make all 
assumptions on which correctness properties 
depend explicit in the form of program 
annotations. If one of these assumptions is 
violated during code evolution, this will be 
detected by the verifier. 
Another aspect of code evolution that is 
of particular relevance to this survey article 
is the research on advanced modularization 
concepts that aim to support the modular 
implementation of non-functional cross-
cutting concerns (since security is a prime 
example of such a concern). The most 
common umbrella term for such 
modularization concepts is aspects, and 
languages that support aspects are referred to 
as aspect-oriented languages. There are 
several mature research prototypes of such 
general purpose aspect-oriented 
programming languages, the most 
prominent one being the AspectJ language 
(Kiczales et al., 2001). On the more practical 
side, mainstream component frameworks 
such as Spring, JBoss and Microsoft .Net 
provide general purpose aspect oriented 
extensions. 
 
Secure Code Evolution 
 
Code evolution mainly interacts with 
vulnerabilities in security components and 
vulnerabilities in applications. 
Vulnerabilities in security components can 
often be attributed to the fact that security 
functionality is extremely hard to 
modularize: code dealing with access control 
for instance, is typically spread throughout 
the entire code base. As an example, in the 
Sun JDK 1.3 implementation, a reference to 
the SecurityManager is created at 126 
different places in the code base, and calls to 
the access decision function occur at 170 
different places (Win, 2004). This 
crosscutting nature of security concerns 
makes implementing them error-prone, and 
maintaining them very hard. It is exactly for 
these kinds of vulnerabilities that aspect-
oriented techniques as discussed above can 
provide solutions. By offering new 
modularization constructs that are better at 
modularizing crosscutting concerns such as 
access control. Aspect-oriented 
programming holds great promise for 
reducing the number of vulnerabilities of 
this type (De Win, Piessens, Joosen, & 
Verhanneman, 2002). In particular, by 
supporting modular implementations of 
security functionality such as access control 
or secure communication, these approaches 
support a flexible evolution of that security 
functionality. For example, it is possible to 
implement the stack inspection mechanism 
in Java using Inline Reference Monitors 
(IRMs) (Erlingsson, 2004) while 
 maintaining competitive performance 
(Erlingsson & Schneider, 2000). Such an 
approach has the advantage that the security 
policy can be modified without modifying 
the existing JDK implementations. 
To make sure that no vulnerabilities in the 
application logic itself are introduced during 
evolution, the reasoning about their absence 
should be made modular. Two important 
approaches succeed in modularizing the 
analysis for security vulnerabilities: type 
systems (Pierce, 2002) and modular full 
functional verification (Jacobs et al., 2011). 
An important idea underlying both these 
approaches is the fact that the developer of 
the code is supposed to provide additional 
information (in the form of type annotations, 
assertions, module contracts and so forth) 
that explain why the code is secure. The type 
checker or verifier then checks these 
annotations. If this checking is modular, 
only the parts of the code that are being 
changed need to be rechecked. 
For the typing-based approach, the first 
security-specific type systems focused on 
enforcing information flow properties 
(Volpano, Irvine, & Smith, 1996), and the 
development of such information flow 
security type systems has seen a significant 
amount of activity since then, leading up to 
two fairly mature programming languages 
that support them, FlowCaml (Pottier & 
Simonet, 2003) and JFlow/JIF (Myers, 
1999). But type systems have also been used 
to guarantee other security properties such as 
access control (Walker, 2000).  
The verification-based approach to secure 
code evolution builds on the general purpose 
verification tools mentioned in Section 
Secure Coding. Both information-flow style 
security properties (Barthe, D’argenio, & 
Rezk, 2011) as well as access control style 
properties (Smans et al., 2006) can be casted 
as assertions in a program logic. By 
specifying such assertions, developers can 
support the evolution of code with high 
assurance that such evolution will not break 
intended security properties of the code. 
Security Test Evolution 
 
Testing is the evaluation of software by 
observing its execution. Model-based testing 
(MBT) relies on models to generate tests, to 
execute tests or to evaluate their results. 
Model-based testing offers big potential for 
automation and adaptation in the testing 
process. It is therefore well-suited (1) for 
testing dynamically evolving systems where 
test suites have to be executed several times 
which is not possible if the test execution is 
not automated, (2) where tests have to be 
modified which is much easier on the 
abstract level of models than on the code 
level, and (3) where tests even have to be 
regenerated which is supported by the 
automated derivation of test cases in many 
model-based testing approaches. Regression 
testing is a selective retesting to verify that 
modifications have not caused unintended 
effects and that the system under test still 
complies with the specified requirements 
(IEEE, 1990). Regression testing is essential 
to verify evolving systems when they are 
changed and also takes the test evolution 
management into account. After an overview 
of security testing, we then discuss 
regression testing including test evolution 
management in Section Regression Testing, 
and finally consider their combination in 
Section Security Test Evolution on security 
testing and evolution management. 
 
Security Testing 
 
Security testing is software testing of 
security requirements like confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, authorization, 
availability, and non-repudiation. Security 
testing can be divided into security 
functional testing and security vulnerability 
testing (Tian-yang, Yin-sheng, & You-yuan, 
2010). Security functional testing ensures 
whether security functions (positive security 
requirements) are implemented correctly and 
consistently with respect to security 
  
requirements. Security vulnerability testing 
addresses the identification and discovery of 
yet unknown vulnerabilities (negative 
security requirements) that are introduced by 
security design flaws or software defects. 
Security vulnerability testing lacks 
approaches for systematic design, execution 
and evaluation of tests and uses the 
simulation of attacks like performed by 
hackers which is called penetration testing. 
Model-based testing techniques provide 
additional support to lower the required level 
of expertise needed for security testing 
(Felderer, Agreiter, Zech, & Breu, 2011). By 
using models, the level of abstraction is 
raised which enables more people to design 
tests, and the model can be employed to 
automatically generate test cases. 
Additionally, security models are often 
created in conjunction with a risk analysis. 
This risk information can, on the one hand, 
be used for deriving test cases, and, on the 
other hand, for prioritizing test execution. 
Felderer et al. (2011) classify model-based 
testing approaches along the two dimensions 
risk integration and automated test 
generation. Based on the different 
perspectives used in securing a system, 
Schieferdecker et al. (Schieferdecker, 
Grossmann, & Schneider, 2012) distinguish 
several types of input models for test 
generation, i.e., (1) architectural and 
functional models, (2) threat, fault and risk 
models, and (3) weakness and vulnerability 
models. A powerful test approach which is 
especially useful for security testing is 
mutation (Weiglhofer, Aichernig, & 
Wotawa, 2009). Typically, mutation testing 
is used to qualify test suites by running tests 
against a mutation of the system under test. 
The quality of the test suite is stated with 
respect to the number of mutants being 
detected by the test suite. For security 
testing, models of the system under test are 
mutated in a way that the mutants represent 
known vulnerabilities (Schieferdecker et al., 
2012). These vulnerability models can then 
be used for test generation by various MBT 
approaches. The generated tests are used to 
check whether the system under test is 
vulnerable with respect to the vulnerabilities 
in the model. 
 
Regression Testing 
 
Regression testing is considered very 
expensive but an essential activity in the 
software maintenance process. Hence, 
evolving systems must be validated before 
their redeployment on the market and this is 
even more crucial for critical evolving 
systems, on which safety and security 
depends. Thus, the process of regression 
testing takes into account testing the code 
before delivery of the product. It aims to 
ensure that changes at code level, which 
correspond to changes at requirements level 
described in the specification, do not impact 
the non-modified code. It can be performed 
on several testing levels, i.e., unit, 
integration, and system level. 
According to the accessibility of test 
design artifacts, regression testing can be 
code-based, also called white box regression 
testing or model-based. Indeed, these two 
types are considered as complementary and 
both of them are effective in revealing 
regression faults. Rothermel et al. (2001) 
clarify the regression testing strategies and 
separate them in the two categories retest-All 
techniques and selective techniques. Retest-
All techniques require execution of the 
entire test suite, provided from the previous 
version, on the new system’s version. 
Selective techniques require selection of a 
subset of the test suite, which may reveal 
errors in the new system, using different 
approaches. Thus, selective regression 
testing techniques can be classified into the 
categories minimization, coverage-based, 
safe as well as ad-hoc random. The goal of 
minimization techniques is to choose the 
minimal number of tests from the original 
test suite, those crossing through the 
modified instructions or affected by the 
program modification. The goal of coverage-
 based approaches is to take into account the 
path and data dependence graph coverage by 
tests. Safe techniques ensure that all tests 
selected from the initial test suite may reveal 
faults in the system. Most of the 
minimization and flow-based techniques are 
said not to be safe. Ad-hoc techniques 
consider that all tests from the initial suite 
may reveal faults and selects randomly a 
certain number of tests. As mentioned 
before, all these techniques are based either 
on code, or on models. Latter have several 
benefits. Model-based techniques (1) permit 
the traceability between the specification and 
the testing activity, (2) from scalability point 
of view, these techniques easy the work with 
very complex and industry scale systems, 
and finally (3) they are independent from 
programming languages. 
 
Security Test Evolution 
 
During the last years research shows 
increasing work in the domain of validation 
and verification of security requirements, in 
particular for critical systems. A great 
attention is given to testing different variants 
of positive and negative security 
requirements like security properties, access 
control policies or vulnerabilities (see 
Section Security Testing). It has been 
achieved to create stable and certified 
critical systems and, in case of evolution and 
introducing new requirements, the main goal 
is to preserve these security requirements. 
Practitioners are aware that the security 
requirements must be preserved and verified 
for the new and evolved system. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, 
very few research is done in the field of 
regression testing for security requirements, 
called security regression testing (SRT) 
although studies on the system development 
lifecycle (Mehta, 2007) underline the 
importance of regression testing while 
verifying the vulnerabilities of a system. 
Authors in (Alnatheer, Gravell, & Argles, 
2010; Kongsli, 2006), remind the need of 
regression testing for security requirements 
in agile development. Kongsli (2006) 
suggests applying misuse stories, contrary to 
use case stories, and considers them as 
possibility to take into account requirements 
link to security issues. Moreover, he 
proposes to use tests dedicated to misuse 
stories in order to ensure regression testing. 
Furthermore, authors in (SecureChange, 
2012) present a model-based regression 
testing approach for system security. The 
security requirements are captured through 
schemas (or scenarios), written in the 
Smartesting Schema Language, which are 
further used to drive the test generation. The 
evolving aspects of the systems are captured 
by adapting the SeTGaM technique 
(Fourneret, Bouquet, Dadeau & Debricon, 
2011) to security requirements. They 
manage the test's life cycle for the new 
system version through finer grained status 
and update. Further, their approach selects a 
precise set of security requirements from the 
new version not covered by current tests and 
generates tests only for this set, thereby 
avoiding the unnecessary full regeneration of 
tests for the new version. 
Felderer et al. (2011) consider model-
based security regression testing of service-
centric systems. They attach state machines 
to all model elements of the requirements, 
system, and test model to obtain consistent 
and traceable evolution. Adding, modifying 
or deleting model elements trigger change 
events and fire transitions in the state 
machines. Tests have an additional type 
following the classification of Leung and 
White (1989) which can be evolution, for 
testing novelties of the system, regression, 
for testing non-modified parts and ensuring 
that evolution did not unintentionally take 
place on other parts, stagnation, for ensuring 
that evolution did actually take place and 
changed the behavior of the system, and 
obsolete, for tests which are not relevant any 
more. Based on a test requirement expressed 
as an OCL query and considering the actual 
state of model elements as well as the type 
  
of tests, a regression test suite is selected and 
executed.  
In addition, Hwang et al. (2012) suggest 
three regression test selection techniques for 
access control policies specified in XACML. 
The techniques are based on: (1) mutation, 
(2) coverage, and (3) recorded request 
evaluation of access-control policies. Each 
policy P is composed of rules ri. The first 
technique, first makes a correlation between 
rules and tests, then selects the rules ri from 
P and creates mutants of the policy by 
changing the rules decision, denoted M(ri). 
This technique selects tests revealing 
different behaviors of the policy when 
executing tests on the program in interaction 
with the policy P and its mutants M(ri). It is 
very costly, since it executes tests 2 · n 
times, where n is the number of rules in the 
policy. The second technique monitors 
which rules are evaluated for requests issued 
from the execution of test case on the 
program in interaction with the policy. Then 
it establishes a correlation, as the previous 
technique, between rules and tests. Finally, 
the last technique records requests issued 
from security checks, called Policy 
Enforcement Points (PEPs) when executing 
tests on the program. The tests which 
encapsulate different decisions for the given 
policy and the modified one are selected for 
regression testing. 
Hence, much research work is done in the 
field of regression testing of functionalities 
in a system, but Yoo and Harman (2010) 
point out the need to continue the 
investigation in regression testing non-
functional requirements like security. 
 
 
Security Monitoring 
 
In this section, we discuss a specific branch 
of monitoring called security monitoring. 
We do not discuss any particular flavor of 
security monitoring in abundant detail, but 
focus however on providing a coarse, yet 
broad, discussion of ongoing research and 
industrial efforts in various areas of security 
monitoring.  
Monitoring can be seen as the ongoing 
process of evaluating artifacts, i.e., 
computers, processes, whole infrastructures 
or even people based on certain criteria, e.g., 
specified through policies. Security 
monitoring itself is more specific. On an 
abstract level, its major goal is to detect 
security violations during operation. Such 
violations can be classified as technical, e.g., 
data leakage, or business violations, e.g., 
compliance violation of legal requirements 
such as HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act). The tasks for 
security monitoring can be further refined. 
Attack detection, for instance, is used to 
detect insider and/or outsider ongoing 
attacks on a technical more abstract level. 
The tools employed for this kind of 
monitoring depend on the focus point. The 
technical point of view is provided by 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) 
(Denning, 1987; Lunt, 1993) with insider 
attack detection capabilities as proposed by 
Schultz et al. (Schultz, 2002). Whereas, an 
insider attack focused solely on business 
activity, would be considered by monitoring 
in the area of fraud detection. A substantial 
survey of work on fraud detection is 
provided by Phua et al. (2005). 
 
The following description of a security 
monitoring schematic is the standard 
architecture for IDSs, yet it is general 
enough to apply to any monitoring 
architecture discussed here. The Common 
Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) 
managed by the Intrusion Detection Working 
Group (IDWG) defined a common 
architecture for IDS (Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-
Verdejo, MaciaFernandez, & Vazquez, 
2009) by using four functional components 
which are as follows: 
• E blocks, also called Event-boxes, are 
basically configured sensors that 
monitor given target systems. 
 • D blocks, also called Database-boxes, 
store event data received by the E 
blocks and allow further processing. 
• A blocks, also called Analysis-boxes, 
are components that allow further 
analysis on data within D blocks. 
• R blocks, also called Response-boxes, 
allow reacting on alerts, e.g., stop 
execution of a compromised system or 
revoke access for a user. 
 
Different locations (e.g., layers in the 
ISO/OSI model) for event-boxes imply a 
variety of different security monitoring 
branches. E blocks may collect network 
traffic, database activity, host activity, user 
activity, or Web Service activity. Such a 
general architecture allows, therefore, to 
split IDS further into Host-based/Network-
based IDS ((H)NIDS). Other types include, 
for instance, Web Services Monitoring if the 
focus is on Web Services. If gathered data is 
mainly business-oriented, such as credit card 
transactions, trade activity, product sale 
statistics, it is called Business Activity 
Monitoring.  
Altering A blocks, does not change the 
branch of monitoring, but rather the 
reasoning/evaluation technique that is used. 
Standard A blocks usually consist of either 
signatures, statistical, or machine learning 
algorithms. Signatures are provided by 
experts to perform a rule-based analysis of 
an incident. In short, signatures are basically 
a look-up table to discern if features, 
extracted from event data in D blocks, are 
malicious. Statistical algorithms usually 
revolve around statistical outlier tests, i.e., 
testing deviations in given distributions via 
the Grubbs test, or hypothesis tests to test if 
samples correspond to certain distributions, 
among others the χ2 or the Kolmogorow-
Smirnow test (Denning, 1987; Kruegel & 
Vigna, 2003; Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009; 
Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009). 
Machine learning-based algorithms usually 
orbit around, e.g., SVMs, Clustering, 
Bayesian, or Markovian methods to classify 
given data instances as attacks or anomalies 
(Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009; Chandola et 
al., 2009; K. Leung & Leckie, 2005; Gu, 
Perdisci, Zhang, & Lee, 2008). 
The most common analysis types in 
security monitoring are signature-based and 
anomaly-based approaches. And among 
those two, signature-based methods seem to 
be used more often in the industry 
(Sourcefire, n.d.; Alienvault, n.d.; Trend 
Micro, n.d.). The main reason why 
signature-based approaches are popular 
among industrial areas are basically the ease 
of deployment, the ease of adapting the 
monitoring system to new threats (assuming 
there are known and significant patterns), a 
low number of false-positives, and 
intelligible reports. On the other side, 
algorithms for anomaly detection (either 
statistical or machine learning-based) are, 
due to their intricacy, generally hard to 
maintain. They produce a high number of 
false-positives if used incorrectly, and 
conveying results over reports tends to be 
hard. Yet, anomaly detection approaches 
have shown their value in identifying 
attacks, never identifiable with signature-
based methods, for instance, user 
masquerading attacks (Schonlau et al., 
2001). The IDWG schematic above makes it 
clear that by changing the focus of the E 
boxes and the type of analysis of the A 
boxes it is possible to build various variants 
for security monitoring systems, including 
hybrid ones. A signature-based IDS can, for 
instance easily be combined with anomaly 
detection elements (e.g., SNORT by using 
the network anomaly plugin SPADE, or 
applying HTTP traffic extraction to perform 
a semantic anomaly-based intrusion 
detection (EstévezTapiador, Garcıa-
Teodoro, & Dıaz-Verdejo, 2004)). 
A specialized signature-based monitoring 
technique is known as Complex Event 
Processing (CEP) (Luckham, 2008). CEP 
helps security experts to correlate the large 
quantity of different events from various 
sources. CEP itself is an umbrella term for 
  
methods processing events, in real-time 
through sensors, query languages, event 
databases, and internal query 
representations. In short, multiple minor 
events are matched with queries in the 
database and imply a complex, more severe 
or meaningful, event. 
 
Correlation 
 
A huge problem for security operators are 
the number of false-positives and 
meaningless alerts from the network. The 
reduction of false-positives and increase for 
the confidence of alerts, led to correlation 
and aggregation algorithms (Julisch, 2003; 
Ning, Cui, & Reeves, 2002), the creation and 
handling of attack models, i.e., attack graphs 
(Phillips & Swiler, 1998; Noel & Jajodia, 
2004), automated model creation tools (Ou, 
Govindavajhala, & Appel, 2005), and even 
model-based correlation (Roschke, Cheng, 
& Meinel, 2011).  
Julisch et al. (2003) leverage clustering to 
perform aggregation of alerts via 
generalization hierarchies, distance metrics, 
and derived dendrograms and achieve a 
massive reduction of alerts. In Ning et al. 
(2002), attack scenarios are mined by 
matching alert information, e.g., formal 
prerequisites and consequences assigned to 
them, and thus aggregating them. Attack 
graphs were introduced by (Phillips & 
Swiler, 1998) to provide a graph-based 
vulnerability analysis to assess consequences 
for assets and, hence, also to provide means 
to assess their risk. In their paper they also 
show that analyzing an attack graph can be 
computationally hard (i.e., finding the 
longest paths in such an attack graph is 
NPcomplete). Noel and Jajodia (2004) 
describe a system to manage network attack 
graphs that renders large attack graphs 
feasible for human interaction, for instance 
by allowing to aggregate subsets of the 
attack graph in a hierarchical manner. 
Recently, attack graphs have also been used 
for correlation purposes. In Roschke et al. 
(2011), alerts are linked to nodes in the 
attack tree. Then, a dependency relation is 
forced upon the alerts to attain a dependency 
graph. Finally, the aggregated alerts are 
processed to identify the most suspicious 
subsets of the set. 
 
In the following sections, we discuss various 
branches of security monitoring that 
sometimes rely on signature-based 
approaches (including CEP), statistical 
modeling, and/or machine learning. It is 
important to distinguish these different 
classes of monitoring systems, because of 
their different properties. These groups are 
subsets of Business Activity Monitoring 
(BAM), i.e., fraud closely tied to the 
business layer, Web Services Monitoring 
used to measure the execution of workflows, 
and Security Infrastructure and Event 
Management (SIEM) providing a holistic 
aggregation of security information. Finally, 
we discuss the importance of evolution in 
the area of security monitoring. 
 
Business Activity Monitoring 
 
BAM is a variant of process mining 
considering business relevant services and 
providing a high-level view on workflows, 
transactions, quality of service, but also 
compliance to service-level-agreements. 
Typically, BAM is not considered to be a 
part of security monitoring, with the 
exception if it is done with the purpose of 
fraud detection, which goes hand in hand 
with process mining (van Dongen, De 
Medeiros, Verbeek, Weijters, & van der 
Aalst, 2005). In contrast to IDS, the 
emphasis is on detecting fraudulent behavior 
that causes financial loss, for instance, due to 
insiders. Examples include credit card fraud, 
telecommunication fraud, or fraud in the 
health-care system (Bolton & Hand, 2002). 
Doctors, for instance, may prescribe more 
expensive alternative drugs than cheaper 
generic drugs. The usual procedure is to 
monitor databases, traffic, and messages, to 
 either semantically analyze the content or 
check for statistical obliquities. 
Giblin et al. (2005) take regulations and 
transform them via the use of specialized 
temporal patterns to a timed propositional 
temporal logic which describes a hand-
crafted domain specific model of the 
regulation to monitor. Afterwards, by using 
transformation rules, a monitoring 
architecture is configured.  
Mulo et al. (2009) propose monitoring 
compliance of business processes in SOA 
via CEP means. A service invocation is 
regarded as an event and business process 
activities as event-trails. These event trails 
guide the creation of queries which a CEP 
engine uses to identify and monitor business 
activities. Since the business activities are 
rendered identifiable it is possible to monitor 
the flow of a business process at runtime, 
hence, it is possible to detect anomalous 
process executions. In BAM it is common to 
summarize desired properties in key 
performance indicators (KPI), e.g., the 
average process duration.  
Wetzstein et al. (2009) use that technique 
to do performance monitoring for the 
analysis of WS-BPEL processes, combining 
process events and QoS measurements. They 
propose a framework which uses machine 
learning techniques to construct tree 
structures (binary decision tree generation), 
which represent the dependencies of a KPI 
on process and QoS metrics. Analysts then 
study these dependency trees to determine 
the impact of lower-level process metrics 
and QoS characteristics on the process KPIs.  
To tackle regulatory compliance (for 
example SOX) Holmes et al. (2010) propose 
a model-aware repository and service 
environment (MORSE). In a nutshell, it 
allows the generation of services, business 
process code and monitoring directives via 
model-driven development (MDD) 
techniques. A so created business process 
has compliance models applied to it 
denoting a certain regulation or 
implementation details. Afterwards, this 
annotated process is automatically applied 
on a business process engine. During 
workflow execution, the annotations will be 
retrieved and evaluated by the monitoring 
infrastructure to detect violations. 
Traceability of generated events, code as 
well as model artifacts is managed via 
UUIDs which are attached to events and 
artifacts. The business expert can then 
improve the process via updating the model 
in the repository. 
 
Web Services Monitoring 
 
Although Web Services may be used in 
BAM or IDS, standalone security 
monitoring solutions explicitly for service-
based systems relying on Web Services 
technologies exist (Baresi, Guinea, & 
Plebani, 2006a; Erradi, Maheshwari, & 
Tosic, 2007). To our understanding the key 
difference between BAM and the monitoring 
of Web Services is that the latter mostly 
focuses of events extracted from Web 
Services concerning Web Services, e.g., 
monitoring of dynamic compositions of Web 
Services for SLAs. 
Baresi et al. (Baresi, Guinea, & Plebani, 
2006b) and Erradi et al. (2007) focus on 
monitoring the execution of centrally 
orchestrated Web Services compositions 
(specified in WS-BPEL) in order to detect, 
correlate and react meaningfully to 
incidents. Baresi et al. (Baresi et al., 2006b) 
extends WS-Policy with a language for 
constraints to monitor functional and non-
functional requirements (weaved with the 
BPEL process at deployment-time). This 
approach focuses on monitoring very low-
level security requirements such as signature 
algorithms used. 
Erradi et al. (2007) present a hybrid 
approach for functional and QoS monitoring 
combining synchronous and asynchronous 
monitoring techniques. The authors extend 
WS-Policy to WS-Policy4MASC, and 
present a middleware to provide Web 
Services compositions with policy-enabled 
  
monitoring capabilities. In Leitner et al. 
(2010) a framework called PREvent is 
introduced (based upon event-based 
monitoring of composed services) which 
enables prediction of SLA violations using 
machine learning, but also runtime 
prevention of those violations via triggered 
adaptation actions. The novelty of this idea 
lies in the way the automated composition 
adaptation is done. The framework does not 
wait for violations to take place but rather 
predicts future violation and guarantees 
successful execution by preemptively 
altering the services compositions. 
 
Intrusion Detection 
 
IDS differ from previous monitoring 
technologies mostly by its technical layer 
and its singular view on intrusions. Topics 
applying to IDS are detecting incidents, such 
as, malware propagating in the network, 
infiltration of the network from outside, and 
violation of security policies from internal 
users. Already during the Internet’s infancy 
work in IDS technology was made, which 
led to an excellent summary of IDS 
capabilities in (Denning, 1987) and a follow-
up taxonomy based on relevant IDS 
solutions of the time (Axelsson, 2000). As 
mentioned above, IDS come in various 
shapes, e.g., host-based, network-based, 
Garcia et al. (2009) even go so far as to coin 
the term anomaly-based NIDS (A-IDS) to 
denote specific NIDS that are tailored to 
detect anomalies. Yet they all share the goal 
to help a security expert to detect if an attack 
or intrusion is taking (or took) place. In 
recent years, A-IDS have seen some 
progress and are included in more and more 
enterprise-level commercial intrusion 
detection systems, for a list consider 
(Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). 
Basic techniques in anomaly-detection 
include statistical, information-theoretic and 
machine learning-based approaches. 
Statistical approaches use univariate and 
multivariate modeling, e.g., for statistical 
correlation analysis (Ye, Emran, Chen, & 
Vilbert, 2002). Seminal work in information 
theory and intrusion detection (Lee & Xiang, 
2001) has shown that anomaly detection for 
audit data (ranging from system calls to 
network data) can benefit from information 
theoretic measurements such as, e.g., 
entropy, conditional entropy, and 
information gain. Entropy itself can be used 
to detect aberrations of regularity in 
sequences of records, conditional entropy 
can be used to determine similarity of 
datasets (Lee & Xiang, 2001), whereas 
information gain is known to describe a 
classifier’s ability to classify data. 
Information gain is used explicitly in 
decision tree learning algorithms like ID3 
(Quinlan, 1986) and C4.5 (Quinlan, 1996). 
Techniques for machine learning involve 
both unsupervised, i.e., clustering and 
supervised approaches. Clustering is a quite 
versatile tool as several approaches 
(Oldmeadow, Ravinutala, & Leckie, 2004; 
K. Leung & Leckie, 2005; Gu et al., 2008) 
show. Gu et al. (2008) use clustering for the 
detection of botnets by a framework called 
“Botminer”. Leung and Leckie (2005) 
improve clustering for NIDS by using a 
density-based clustering algorithm and a 
grid-based metric and evaluate their efforts 
on the KDD 1999 data set. Supervised 
approaches involve, for instance, Support 
Vector Machines (Mukkamala, Janoski, & 
Sung, 2002), Neural Networks (Debar, 
Becker, & Siboni, 1992), Bayesian 
Networks (Kruegel, Mutz, Robertson, & 
Valeur, 2003), and fuzzy data mining (Jin, 
Sun, Chen, & Han, 2004). 
 
Security Monitoring Evolution 
 
In this section, we discuss trends and 
developments of security monitoring in 
research and industry. Security monitoring is 
arguably a very mature field, so during the 
last decade many problems have been 
solved. For instance identifying potential 
event sources and detection mechanisms 
 (Denning, 1987), various ways to perform 
anomaly detection (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 
2009), scalable and distributed architectures 
for monitoring (Balasubramaniyan, Garcia-
Fernandez, Isacoff, Spafford & Zamboni, 
1998 Tierney et al., 2002) and formats to let 
security monitoring systems communicate 
with each other, i.e., the Intrusion Message 
Exchange Format (ID -MEF) (Debar, Curry, 
& Feinstein, 2007). The main methods of 
detection based signatures or statistics 
(including anomaly detection), defeat known 
malware, if signatures and distributions are 
known. But attackers, their attacks and the 
patterns thereof evolve. Therefore security 
monitoring systems have to evolve as well. 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are an 
example for this type of evolution. The 
difference between normal attacks and APTs 
is best explained by elaborating on the 
keywords. 
Advanced denotes a series of well-
coordinated attacks by an organization with 
massive financial means and a high degree 
of expertise. Culprits of such attacks are 
therefore often criminal organizations or 
governments. The tools in use are usually 
tailored to the scenario. 
Persistent denotes that attacks are usually 
part of a larger process that involves 
scouting, intrusion, impersonation, and 
knowledge acquisition. Since the attack is 
spread over a larger amount of time, e.g., 
months, suspicions are low. 
 
Issues related to ongoing espionage, 
destruction of industrial units, or new 
generation tools (e.g., Stuxnet, Duqu, 
Sykipot) have always been associated with 
the term APT (Gao, Morris, Reaves, & 
Richey, 2010; Bencsáth, Pék, Buttyán, & 
Félegyházi, 2012; Sood & Enbody, 2013). 
APTs are currently an open research 
problem since they demand comprehensive 
monitoring, correlation and context 
information by threat intelligence, as well as 
means to determine changes in behavior, 
e.g., via anomaly detection (Binde, McRee, 
& O’Connor, 2011). To address the problem 
of APTs, industrial as well as scientific 
security monitoring grow together to build 
systems that incorporate current best 
practices, such as signature-based 
monitoring, rule-based correlation, as well as 
other features, such as context information, 
multi-layer anomaly detection, and 
collaborative intrusion detection (CID). An 
industry example of context information and 
CID is provided by AlienVault’s Open 
Threat Exchange (OTE). OTE allows users 
of OSSIM (Alienvault, n.d.) to share threat 
intelligence, e.g., bad IP address ranges. 
Recently, CID is also employed in the area 
of cloud security monitoring (Sood & 
Enbody, 2013; Zargar, Takabi, & Joshi, 
2011). Context information is often provided 
by models, e.g., Gander et al. (2011) provide 
a metamodel that allows modeling of an IT 
landscape to link infrastructure artifacts, 
such as workflows, executing services, 
hosts, and users, to each other in order to 
provide a better context for anomaly 
detection and detect complex attack patterns.  
Anomaly detection itself undergoes 
improvements. Horng et al. (2011) show, 
that they were capable to improve the 
detection performance of IDS on the KDD 
dataset by combining SVMs and hierarchical 
clustering in a single algorithm.  
Preliminary work of Gander et al. (2012) 
tries to combine CEP for workflow 
monitoring and anomaly detection to create 
profiles of database and network usage. By 
linking profile information to service events 
access control violations are detected.  
Industrial detection systems, e.g., OSSIM 
and Prelude, allow to aggregate information 
from many sources, but are not explicitly 
designed to handle the amount of data that 
supports wider statistical analysis. Advances 
in database research and log management, 
especially in tool support, could make this 
easier. Logstash and Graylog2, for instance, 
are two open source log management 
frameworks allowing efficient storage of 
large amounts of data in a distributed 
  
manner. They incorporate state of the art 
large database querying support (e.g., 
leveraging ElasticSearch) and allow 
traditional and non-traditional databases 
(e.g., SQL, MongoDB). 
To sum up, detection systems leveraging 
agile, pluggable, frameworks may handle 
large amounts of data much more easily and 
perform anomaly detection in all kinds of 
layers. For instance the application layer, 
detecting application anomalies, service 
invocation anomalies, or in the network 
layer, detecting network anomalies (e.g., 
TCP, UDP). The achieved combination of 
aforementioned best practices, such as rule-
based, or model-based, correlation of events 
and statistical methods crunching through 
large datasets will provide better detection 
rates and reduce false-positives. 
 
 
Security Risk Evolution 
 
Risk management is defined as the 
“coordinated activities to direct an 
organization with regard to risk” (“ISO 
31000 – Risk management – Principles and 
guidelines”, 2009). A core part of these 
activities is a regularly conducted risk 
analysis to identify threats, vulnerabilities 
and unwanted incidents with respect to 
critical assets. The severity of the identified 
risks must be estimated, and then evaluated 
with respect to predefined criteria to 
determine which risks need to be modified 
by risk treatment. 
Traditional approaches to risk analysis 
typically focus on a particular configuration 
of the target at a particular point in time, and 
are valid under the assumptions made in the 
analysis (Lund, Solhaug, & Stølen, 2010). 
However, the target of analysis, its 
environment and the assumptions we make 
will change and evolve over time, during 
software development, during deployment, 
and at runtime. Such evolutions may render 
previous risk analyzes invalid and require 
the whole risk analysis to be conducted from 
scratch. There is therefore a need for 
methods and techniques to handle change 
and evolution in a systematic way so as to 
maintain the validity of risk analysis results 
under change. This section gives an 
overview of the state of the art in this 
domain, focusing on security risk analysis in 
the software development life cycle. In the 
next sub-section we give an introduction to 
risk analysis in general, give the most 
important definitions and explain which 
artifacts that are used and produced. 
Subsequently we focus on security and 
explain the most important aspects and 
activities of security risk analysis. In the 
remaining two subsections we give an 
overview of the state of the art for managing 
and analyzing evolving risks; first we 
address evolving risks in general, and then 
we address evolving security risks. 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
The ISO 31000 standard (“ISO 31000 – Risk 
management – Principles and guidelines”, 
2009) defines risk management as an 
iterative process. The activities include the 
specification of the target of analysis with its 
focus and scope, the risk identification, 
analysis and estimation, and finally the risk 
treatment. While differing in methods and 
techniques for risk assessment and risk 
modeling, most of the established 
approaches to risk analysis, such as 
OCTAVE (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001), 
CORAS (Lund, Solhaug, & Stølen, 2011a) 
and CRAMM (Siemens, n.d.), follow the 
ISO 31000 process. The same process is also 
followed by several more security tailored 
approaches, such as EBIOS (“EBIOS 2010 – 
Expression of Needs and Identification of 
Security Objectives”, 2010), the Microsoft 
Security Risk Management Guide (“The 
Security Risk Management Guide”, 2006) 
and FRAAP (Peltier, 2010). 
When conducting a risk analysis, there is 
a need for techniques and means to reason 
 about various aspects of risks, and to 
document the results, while following the 
overall risk management process. Risk 
modeling refers to techniques that are used 
to aid the process of identifying and 
estimating likelihood and consequence 
values. A risk model is a structured way of 
representing an event, its causes and 
consequences using graphs, trees or block 
diagrams (Robinson, 2007). Some well-
known risk modeling techniques are fault 
tree analysis (FTA) (“IEC 61025 Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA)”, 1990), event tree analysis 
(ETA) (“IEC 60300-9 Dependability 
management Part 3: Application guide 
Section 9: Risk analysis of technological 
systems Event Tree Analysis (ETA)”, 1995), 
attack trees (S. Schneider, 1999), cause-
consequence diagrams (Robinson, 2007; 
Mannan, 2005) and Bayesian networks 
(Ben-Gal, 2007). 
 
An inherent challenge in most risk analyzes 
is the modeling and assessment of 
uncertainty, which is often due to lack of 
knowledge or imprecise and insufficient 
data. Many traditional risk models are based 
on probability theory and classical set theory 
where uncertainty is not easily represented. 
For this reason various approaches based on 
fuzzy logic, see, e.g., (Zadeh, 1965; Cox, 
1994), have been proposed. Fuzzy logic 
allows the uncertainty to be made explicit, 
and comes with rules and operations for 
reasoning about this uncertainty when 
assessing the risks. 
No matter which risk analysis method and 
risk modeling technique has been chosen, 
the objective is to build and maintain a risk 
model that provides a valid documentation 
of the risks, given the target description as 
documented during the context 
establishment. The target description should 
include the assets and stakeholders of the 
analysis, the focus and scope, the 
assumptions we make, as well as the target 
model. The target model is a specification of 
the elements of the target of analysis, 
including software and hardware 
components, users and roles, information 
and communication networks, business and 
work processes, and so forth. The target 
model is created using a suitable notation 
such as activity diagrams, class diagrams, 
data flow diagrams or business process 
modeling. When using risk analysis to 
support the software development life cycle, 
such models can be received as input from, 
for example, the software design and 
architecture or from the requirements 
engineering. Obviously, a change in any part 
or aspect of the target description may have 
impact on the risk picture, requiring an 
updated analysis and risk model. After 
introducing security to the setting of risk 
management in the next sub-section, we 
proceed by presenting existing approaches to 
handle such change and evolution. 
 
Security Risk Analysis 
 
Security risk analysis can be understood as a 
specialization of risk analysis, where the 
focus is on preservation of security and the 
protection of information assets. The 
ISO/IEC 27005 (“ISO/IEC 27005 – 
Information technology – Security 
techniques – Information security risk 
management”, 2011) standard on 
information security risk management builds 
on ISO 31000 and follows the same overall 
process. The purpose is to provide guidelines 
to support the requirements of an 
information security management system 
(ISMS) according to ISO/IEC 27001 
(“ISO/IEC 27001 – Information technology 
– Security techniques – Information security 
management systems – Requirements”, 
2005). 
For risk management in general, assets 
can be of any kind, for example revenue, 
property, market share, personnel, life and 
health, reputation, and so forth. Security risk 
management, on the other hand, typically 
concerns business processes and activities, 
as well as information assets. It is moreover 
  
concerned with the preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information and services (“ISO/IEC 27001 – 
Information technology – Security 
techniques – Information security 
management systems – Requirements”, 
2005) by preventing information security 
incidents. Other security properties that may 
be taken into account are authentication, 
non-repudiation and authorization (Hernan 
et al., 2006). 
In secure software engineering, security 
risk analysis should be an integrated part of 
the development lifecycle. For this purpose, 
the models and specifications that are 
developed during security requirements 
engineering, secure software modeling, 
security architecture and security test 
modeling should provide input to the 
security risk analysis process. In an iterative 
engineering process, the security risk 
analysis has then the potential to identify 
possible security design flaws and provide 
feedback to the security engineering 
activities. 
 
Risk Evolution 
 
Evolution is unavoidable in most systems 
and organizations, and while systems change 
the associated risks change too. This is not 
new, and as prescribed by ISO 31000, risk 
management should detect “changes in the 
external and internal context, including 
changes to the risk criteria and the risk itself, 
which can require revision of risk treatment 
and priorities” (“ISO 31000 – Risk 
management – Principles and guidelines”, 
2009). However, as software and 
information systems become more and more 
heterogeneous, dynamic and interoperable, 
evolution becomes a critical factor that 
needs to be dealt with systematically. For the 
management and analysis of evolving risks, 
a main challenge is how to respond to 
system and software changes, either during 
development or at runtime. The objective is 
to maintain the validity of the risk model and 
the risk analysis results without conducting a 
full risk analysis from scratch every time 
(Lund et al., 2010; Lund, Solhaug, & Stølen, 
2011b). Moreover, when risks are changing 
and evolving they should be analyzed and 
understood as such. In other words, the 
management of evolving risks should be 
supported by techniques for modeling, 
assessing and reasoning about risk changes. 
Such techniques will allow planning and 
proactive decisions regarding desired or 
possible software and system changes. 
Traditional methods and techniques for 
risk management, including the ISO 31000 
standard, are not well equipped to address 
evolution in a methodical and systematic 
way. However, the increased awareness of 
these challenges, both in industry and in the 
research communities, has led to substantial 
advances during the recent few years. In the 
remainder of this section we give an 
overview of some of these approaches, 
focusing on security in software systems. 
 
Security Risk Evolution 
 
For software and systems that are rapidly 
evolving, either during development or 
operation, there is a need for strong 
traceability between the target model and the 
risk model. This can be done by building and 
maintaining traceability links between the 
model artifacts of the two domains and 
propagate changes between them. Another 
approach, which is more relevant at runtime 
during operation, is security risk monitoring 
by the monitoring of security indicators or 
metrics in the target of analysis. Changes in 
software or system attributes with relevance 
for the security risk level can then be 
monitored in order to continuously assess 
risks and respond to unacceptable risks when 
they arise. In the following we describe 
existing approaches by considering in turn 
methodological support, risk modeling 
techniques, tool support and risk monitoring. 
 
Methods to Analyze Evolving Risks. Lund et 
 al. (Lund et al., 2011b) address the problem 
of insufficient methodological support for 
handling change in traditional and standard 
risk management frameworks. To mitigate 
this they propose guidelines and techniques 
for systematically tracing changes from the 
target model to the risk model, and thereby 
updating only the part of the risk picture that 
is affected by the changes. 
The contribution regarding methodology 
is twofold. The first contribution is a 
generalization of the ISO 31000 guidelines 
to provide support for handling change in all 
activities of the risk management process. 
The guiding principle is that only the risks 
that may be affected by changes in the target 
should be analyzed anew. The second 
contribution is the instantiation of the 
generalized guidelines in CORAS (Lund et 
al., 2011a). The ISO 31000 standard 
provides guidelines on which activities to 
conduct and what should be achieved in each 
activity, but it comes with no techniques for 
how to do this in practice. Such techniques, 
including risk modeling techniques, are 
typically offered by risk analysis 
frameworks that instantiate the standard, 
such as OCTAVE, CORAS and CRAMM. 
The goal of generalizing the standard to 
support change management is to offer the 
necessary generic guidelines that can be 
instantiated in any approach that is 
compliant with the standard, as 
demonstrated with CORAS by Lund et al. 
(Lund et al., 2011b). 
An important aspect of this generalized 
approach is the support for explicitly 
documenting risk changes. Hence, the 
approach not only supports updating and 
maintaining the validity of risk models under 
change, but also the modeling and 
assessment of how the risks evolve while the 
target of analysis evolves. For this purpose, 
the risk graph notation (Brændeland, 
Refsdal, & Stølen, 2010) for formal risk 
modeling and analysis is generalized to 
capture change. The risk graph notation is 
moreover extended with support for 
modeling the traceability links to the target 
model. Further details on this modeling 
support are presented in the next subsection.  
At the level of methodology, we are not 
aware of any other methods or frameworks 
that embed change and evolution 
management as an explicit aspect of the 
whole security risk management process. 
The relevance and importance of change 
management is of course widely recognized 
as indicated, not only by ISO 31000, but also 
established methods like OCTAVE (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2001). The recommendations 
and guidelines are, however, usually limited 
to the general monitoring and reviewing 
activities.  
 
Modeling Evolving Risks. While the state of 
the art on evolution in risk management and 
security risk assessment is limited at the 
level of methodology, there has been more 
progress at the level of risk modeling. These 
are techniques that can be utilized by 
analysts to handle change and evolution in a 
systematic and efficient way, even when the 
underlying methodology as such is more 
traditional and conventional, for instance 
those based on ISO 31000 or ISO/IEC 
27005.  
Some of the established techniques for 
risk and threat modeling facilitate automatic 
updating of the values that are annotated on 
the diagrams; by changing input values to 
capture changes in the target of analysis, the 
derived output values can be generated. 
These techniques include fault trees (“IEC 
61025 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)”, 1990), 
Markov models (R. A. Howard, 1971; “IEC 
61165 Application of Markov Techniques”, 
1995) and Bayesian networks (BenGal, 
2007). Influence diagrams (R. A. Howard & 
Matheson, 2005) were originally a graphical 
language designed to support decision 
making by specifying the factors influencing 
a decision. In (EEC, 2006), such diagrams 
are connected to the leaf nodes of fault trees 
supporting the propagation of influence to 
  
the unwanted incidents specified at the root 
of the tree. Similar, but simpler, are the risk 
influence diagrams, detailed in (Aven, Sklet, 
& Vinnem, 2006), where influencing factors 
are connected to the nodes in event trees. 
Several other notations have support for 
associating elements of risk models to parts 
of the target description, which may 
facilitate the identification of possible risk 
changes due0 to target changes. Approaches 
based on the UML, such as misuse cases 
(Sindre & Opdahl, 2000), may utilize built-
in mechanisms in the UML for relating 
elements from different UML diagrams that 
serve as the target model. 
As mentioned above, Lund et al. (Lund et 
al., 2011b) make use of risk graphs 
(Brændeland et al., 2010) to provide 
modeling support for their process and 
guidelines for security risk management of 
changing and evolving systems. An 
advantage of risk graphs is that they can be 
understood as a common abstraction of 
several established risk modeling techniques, 
such as fault trees, event trees, cause-
consequence diagrams, Bayesian networks 
and CORAS threat diagrams. Lund et al. 
extend the risk graph notation with support 
for specifying risk elements that emerge 
after change, risk elements that become 
obsolete, and risk elements that are 
modified. Semantics is provided for this 
extension, and the risk graph calculus is 
extended to provide support for the 
reasoning about risk graphs with change. 
The syntax is moreover extended with 
support for relating risk graph elements to 
elements of the target model. The 
specification of these relations is referred to 
as the trace model, as it facilitates the 
systematic traceability of changes from the 
target model to the risk model.  
Thales Research & Technology has 
developed their own industrial model-based 
approach to risk assessment, supported by 
the Rinforzando (Paul & Delande, 2011; 
Bergomi, Paul, Solhaug, & Vignon-
Davillier, 2013) tool. The security risk 
assessment and modeling can be performed 
as standalone, but is also designed to serve 
as an integrated part of their mainstream 
system engineering workbench (Voirin, 
2008). For this purpose, dynamic links can 
be built and maintained between the risk 
models and the system engineering models, 
the latter specified using a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA) modeling suit. When any 
model changes are implemented during the 
system development process, either on the 
risk model or the system model, the changes 
are immediately propagated via the links to 
trigger updates and maintain the mutual 
consistency between the modeling domains. 
The problem of traceability between 
model artifacts is well-addressed in the 
model-driven engineering (MDE) 
community, where a strong trend is to 
develop a viewpoint (“ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 
– Systems and software engineering – 
Architecture description”, 2011) for each 
engineering concern. Each viewpoint should 
come with its own modeling and analysis 
techniques, but also with means for mapping 
of its model artifacts to the related artifacts 
of the other viewpoints. In the context of 
safety critical systems, such traceability 
between the system development process 
and the risk assessment process is proposed 
in (Katta & Stålhane, 2011). 
 
Tool Support for Analyzing Evolving Risks. 
A full risk analysis will typically result in a 
large number of risk diagrams covering 
different parts of the target model. Without 
any automated tool support, the task of 
tracing changes from the target model to the 
risk model must be conducted manually and 
can easily become infeasible. 
The tool presented in (Seehusen & 
Solhaug, 2012; Solhaug & Seehusen, 2013) 
is developed to support the CORAS 
instantiation of the method and language for 
security risk assessment of evolving systems 
proposed by Lund et al. (Lund et al., 2011b). 
The main feature of the tool is the diagram 
editor for creating all kinds of CORAS 
 diagrams to model and assess changing and 
evolving risks. However, the tool also 
supports the specification of the trace model, 
i.e., the traceability links between elements 
of the risk model and elements of the model 
of the target of analysis. Using the trace 
model the tool automatically flags all risk 
diagrams and elements that may be affected 
by changes in the target and therefore need 
to be re-assessed. The tool also comes with 
automated support for detecting and 
resolving inconsistencies that may arise 
during the process of updating the risk 
models. 
The Rinforzando (Paul & Delande, 2011) 
tool mentioned above is similar in the sense 
of using traceability links between the risk 
model and the system model to maintain 
validity and mutual consistency. The 
integration with their system engineering 
process is hard-coded and much tighter than 
what is offered by CORAS. However, this is 
at the cost of general applicability as 
Rinforzando is tied to the Thales engineering 
workbench, whereas CORAS allows any 
notation to be used for target modeling. The 
integration with the mainstream system 
engineering using Rinforzando not only 
allows establishing the traceability links and 
maintaining online consistency between the 
domains; it also allows the annotation of 
design elements in the engineering 
workbench when they are linked to risk 
model elements, in order to support 
engineers in detecting possible security 
design flaws. 
Model Versioning and Evolution (MoVE) 
(Breu, Breu, & Löw, 2011) is an approach to 
build an infrastructure to maintain the 
validity, mutual consistency and 
interdependencies between models as they 
evolve over time within MDE. The approach 
does not target security and risk in 
particular, but rather builds a tool-supported 
infrastructure for versioning of several 
interdependent models, for example for 
software architecture and design, business 
processes, services, security and risk. 
Similar to the aforementioned tools, the 
underlying idea is to provide support for 
tracing changes from one model to another 
to ensure that they are globally up-to-date 
and mutually consistent 
 
Monitoring Evolving Risks. Risk 
monitoring is a means to facilitate 
continuous risk assessment by the 
monitoring of relevant key indicators or 
metrics. In order to enable security risk 
monitoring there is a need not only to 
identify the relevant indicators, but also to 
understand how to relate the indicators to 
potential security risks, and how to 
aggregate the monitored values into risk 
levels. The benefit of security risk 
monitoring is, of course, that risk assessment 
results can be automatically updated as they 
evolve while the target of analysis evolves. 
Refsdal and Stølen (2009) present a 
model-based approach to make use of 
measurable indicators in order to obtain a 
risk picture that is continuously or 
periodically updated. The approach comes 
with a process of three steps. First, an initial 
risk analysis is conducted to identify and 
model possible threat scenarios and 
unwanted incidents. Second, key indicators 
are identified that may be relevant for 
determining likelihoods and consequences 
for the risk model. Third, functions are 
defined for calculating likelihoods and 
consequences based on the indicators. Using 
this model-based approach, managers and 
other stakeholders are provided a high-level 
view of the current system security by 
observing the updates of the risk models. 
A similar approach is proposed by 
Ligaarden et al. (Ligaarden, Refsdal, & 
Stølen, 2012b). However, they focus on the 
security of dynamic services in the more 
complex setting of systems of systems. The 
latter are collections of systems 
interconnected through the exchange of 
services. The authors propose a method to 
support the capturing and the monitoring of 
the impact of service dependencies on the 
  
security of the provided services. The 
method is divided into four main steps: (1) 
documenting the system of systems and IT 
service dependencies, (2) establishing the 
impact of service dependencies on the 
security risk of provided services, (3) 
identifying measurable indicators for 
dynamic monitoring, and (4) specifying the 
indicator design and use. In a different 
publication (Ligaarden, Refsdal, & Stølen, 
2012a), the same authors address the related 
problem of designing the indicators to be 
monitored. For the security risk monitoring 
to be correct, it is of course crucial that the 
selected indicators provide a valid view of 
the risk picture and the monitored risk level. 
Adequate tool-support is obviously a 
necessity for enabling security risk 
monitoring and the continuous aggregation 
of measured indicator values to generate the 
updated risk levels. Ligaarden et al. (2011) 
propose an architectural pattern for 
enterprise level monitoring tools. Their idea 
is that the pattern should serve as a generic 
basis for building tools with features for 
collecting low-level data from the ICT 
infrastructure, aggregating the collected low-
level data, evaluating the aggregated data, 
presenting the aggregated data and the 
evaluation results to different stakeholders, 
as well as features for doing the necessary 
configurations.  
Krautsevich et al. (2010) propose an 
approach to make use of runtime attribute 
monitoring to support risk-based 
enforcement of usage control (UCON) 
policies. The approach targets the dynamic 
nature of UCON where authorization may 
change over time. Because UCON decisions 
are based on mutable attributes, the values of 
which evolve, the reference monitor 
continuously needs to re-evaluate the 
enforcement decisions. Correctly registering 
all attribute changes is challenging, 
especially if the attribute provider and the 
reference monitor reside in different security 
domains; changes may be missed, delayed or 
event corrupted. There is therefore a risk of 
granting erroneous access and usage. To 
mitigate this, the authors propose a set of 
policy enforcement models with tolerance of 
the inherent uncertainties of current attribute 
values. In these models, the reference 
monitor evaluates logical predicates over 
attributes as usual, but additionally makes 
estimates on how much the observed 
attribute values differ from the actual values. 
By considering the cost of erroneous 
enforcement combined with its probability, 
the associated risk is calculated. The risk 
assessment then serves as a basis for 
decision making. Although the main purpose 
of these approaches is not security risk 
analysis as such, but rather usage control, 
they are still relevant in the setting of 
runtime security assessment and risk 
monitoring because of the use of runtime 
risk analysis of evolving systems. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The increased usage of new service-based 
computing paradigms, like service-oriented 
architecture and cloud computing, results in 
software systems that are distributed, open, 
complex and dynamically changing. Security 
is one of the main issues that must be tackled 
in such environments. Especially, it is 
challenging to face the changing and 
evolutionary nature of such systems. In this 
article we provided a comprehensive state of 
the art survey regarding security evolution 
from a software and security engineering 
perspective. We considered the individual 
phases of the security engineering lifecycle 
and their associated artifacts separately. 
These include modeling, analysis, design, 
implementation, testing, deployment and 
operation as well as risk management. The 
associated artifacts are models, 
requirements, architectures, code, tests, 
runtime monitoring and risks, respectively. 
In the following, we first summarize the 
key issues for each artifact presented in the 
 article and then discuss resulting directions 
of future work. 
 
Summary 
 
In this section, we summarize the key issues 
for each artifact type presented in this 
article, i.e., models, requirements, 
architecture, code, tests, monitoring as well 
as risks. First, we list the references to 
security evolution publications for each 
artifact in Table 1 to provide a 
comprehensive overview, and then we 
discuss each artifact type in detail. 
Artifact References 
Models (Koch et al., 2001), (Goncalves & Poniszewska-Maranda, 2008), 
(Jürjens et al., 2011), (Montrieux et al., 2011), (Ochoa, Jürjens, & 
Cuéllar, 2012), (Ochoa, Jürjens, & Warzecha, 2012), (Ruhroth & 
Jürjens., 2012) 
Requirements (Bergmann et al., 2011), (Massacci et al., 2011) Architecture 
Architecture (Hafiz & Johnson, 2008), (Yskout, Scandariato, & Joosen, 2012a) 
Code (De Win et al., 2002), (Pierce, 2002) , (Jacobs et al., 2011) 
Tests (Kongsli, 2006), (Felderer, Agreiter, & Breu, 2011), (Hwang et al., 
2012), (SecureChange, 2012) 
Monitoring (Gao et al., 2010), (Binde et al., 2011), (Zargar et al., 2011) , 
(Bencsáth et al., 2012), (Sood & Enbody, 2013) 
Risks (EEC, 2006), (Krautsevich et al., 2010), (Refsdal & Stølen, 2009), 
(Lund et al., 2011b), (Ligaarden et al., 2012b), (Ligaarden et al., 
2012a) 
Table 1. References to Security Evolution Publications for each Artifact 
Models. The main artifacts being used in 
model-driven software and security 
engineering methodologies are models. A 
plethora of modeling languages has been 
developed for specifying models for 
different purposes. However, UML is 
considered a de-facto industrial standard for 
modeling and was the focus of this survey. 
Using UML as a modeling language in the 
security engineering process has been 
considered in different lines of work, in 
which security issues have been incorporated 
in the design models at early stages of the 
software development lifecycle. With regard 
to change management, different approaches 
have been proposed to consider evolution of 
(UML) design models throughout all 
development phases. However, the impact of 
change on the security of UML models has 
not been investigated in detail so far. An 
example of a framework that considers 
evolution aspects on security of UML 
models is UMLSec. In this context, the 
UMLSeCh approach has been developed to 
tackle the consistency problems of selected 
UML requirements when models evolve. 
Other approaches consider evolution of 
access control policies.  
 
Requirements. A security requirements 
engineering process consists of three phases: 
(1) asset identification, (2) security goal 
elicitation, and finally, (3) security 
requirement specification. The main security 
requirements engineering approaches that 
can be identified are, goal-based, problem-
based, and risk-based security requirements 
engineering approaches. Evolution in 
security requirements engineering indicates 
how new security needs can be 
accommodated in the requirements models 
and specifications. The recent work with 
regard to requirements evolution can be 
considered from different perspectives. 
Some focus on modeling the evolution, 
others considers the problems that arise from 
evolution, like inconsistency, and finally, 
other work considers the methods and tools 
to assess and manage the impact of change. 
While requirement evolution has been 
  
extensively researched, tackling security 
issue while introducing changes to the 
requirement model has not been well 
studied. The only available approach is a 
model-driven methodology to represent, 
analyze and detect security issues that are 
because of requirements’ evolution. 
 
Architecture. Software architecture can be 
defined as a set of elements, their 
relationships, and some degree of rationale. 
Security at the architectural level may be 
considered form different points of view: 
constructive, modeling and analysis points 
of views. The first perspective tackles the 
problem of how architectures can be created 
with certain security properties. The second 
issue considers modeling security at the 
architectural level. Finally, the analysis 
viewpoint allows performing formal analysis 
on the design of the architecture. With 
regard to evolution, changes of the system 
architecture originate form a change in the 
requirements or the environment of the 
system. These changes at the architectural 
level should be propagated further to other 
deployment artifacts. 
Thus, the evolution of the software 
architecture is tightly related with the 
evolution of requirement, code, and 
deployment configuration. Besides security 
evolution of UML models which is certainly 
relevant for the software architecture as well, 
patterns to securely evolve a system and its 
architecture are under investigation.  
 
Code. Secure code is the central artifact in 
the software engineering process, and it is 
tightly associated with other artifacts, e.g., 
requirements, architecture, testing, and the 
deployment. The properties of the 
programming language, in which the secure 
code is written, that affect security are safety 
and modularity. Vulnerabilities or code bugs 
with security consequences, that are 
associated with coding, can be categorized 
into vulnerabilities in the (1) infrastructural 
software, (2) security components, and (3) 
applications. Examples of countermeasure 
techniques against such vulnerabilities are 
static verification, code guidelines and 
runtime monitoring. Code evolution 
indicates the changes that must be done to 
the software code after being deployed. 
While modularity is an important property to 
support evolution of secure code, security 
functionality is often extremely hard to 
modularize. This crosscutting nature of 
security concerns makes their 
implementation error-prone and hard to 
maintain. For this reason, aspect-oriented 
programming can identify itself as the best 
solution, which is well studied in the 
literature. Code evolution mainly interacts 
with vulnerabilities in security components 
and vulnerabilities in applications. 
Vulnerabilities in security components are 
mainly addressed by new modularization 
concepts that are better at modularizing 
crosscutting concerns such as access control. 
To make sure that no vulnerabilities in the 
application logic itself are introduced during 
evolution, the reasoning about their absence 
is made modular. Two important approaches 
succeed in modularizing the analysis for 
security vulnerabilities, i.e., type systems 
and modular full functional verification. 
 
Tests. Security testing is software testing of 
security requirements like confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, authorization, 
availability, and non-repudiation. Security 
testing can be divided into security 
functional testing (testing positive security 
requirements) and security vulnerability 
testing (testing negative security 
requirements). An important type of 
software testing in the context of (security) 
evolution is regression testing, i.e., the 
selective retesting after changes have been 
made to the system under test (SUT). Its 
goal is to ensure that (1) modifications have 
not introduced new faults or caused 
unintended effects and (2) the SUT still 
compiles with the specified requirements. 
Regression testing has been well studied for 
 classical functional requirements. A great 
attention is given to testing different variants 
of positive and negative security 
requirements like security properties, 
security functionality as well as 
vulnerabilities. However, very little research 
has been done in the field of regression 
testing for security requirements. The few 
available security regression testing 
approaches focus on testing security 
properties and security functionality like 
access control policies. 
 
Monitoring. Security monitoring is the 
processing of evaluating software artifacts 
during operation in order to detect security 
violations. Violation detection can occur on 
different levels of abstraction, e.g., technical 
or business levels, and for different types, 
e.g., security policy violation, data leakage 
prevention, fraud detection, or workflow 
compliance violation. The reasoning or 
analysis component of a security monitoring 
solution can be based either on signatures, 
e.g., complex event processing, or statistical, 
e.g., machine learning, algorithms. The first 
performs rule-based analysis to detect 
intrusions while the latter uses statistical 
algorithms to detect anomalies. In order to 
overcome and detect intrusions or 
anomalies, either signatures or statistical 
distributions of the attack must be known. 
We interpreted “security monitoring 
evolution” as the fact that when attacks 
evolve and their patterns change into 
unknown schemas, the security monitoring 
solution has to evolve accordingly. Beside 
machine learning based approaches, which 
aim at measuring the change in the behavior, 
artificial immune system based intrusion 
detection system have been studied for this 
purpose. 
 
Risks. Risk management is a process that 
involves coordinated activities to direct 
organization decisions with regard to risks. 
The key element in this process is a risk 
analysis activity, whose goal is to identify 
threats and vulnerabilities with respect to 
critical assets. Security risk analysis focuses 
on the preservation of security and the 
protection of information assets. In the 
context of the software development 
lifecycle, the software artifacts under 
development are the target of (security) risk 
analysis. While traditional approaches of 
risk analysis focus on a particular 
configuration of the target at a specific point 
of time, target evolution was not been 
considered in these approaches. Methods to 
analyze evolving risks propose guidelines 
and techniques for systematically tracing 
changes from the target model to the risk 
mode, and thereby only updating the part of 
the risk model affected by the changes. 
Besides the research on methods that tackles 
evolution in risk management, modeling and 
monitoring evolving risk modeling. The idea 
of modeling evolving risk is to associate 
elements of risk models to parts of the target 
model, which facilitates the identification of 
possible risk changes when the target model 
evolves. Monitoring evolving risks is based 
on security risk monitoring and 
automatically updates risk assessment results 
while the target of analysis evolves. 
 
Discussion and future work 
 
This article reveals that evolution of artifacts 
in the different phases of the software 
development lifecycle is tightly coupled. 
Evolution typically starts with changes of 
requirements which are propagated further to 
the design, architectural and implementation 
artifacts. This in turn impacts testing, 
deployment and risk management. Although 
the artifacts are tightly coupled, actual work 
on evolution of security artifacts mostly 
discusses security evolution for a specific 
artifact type in isolation. Modeling can be 
seen as an overlapping aspect across all 
phases to overcome this limitation. As 
discussed in this state of the art survey, 
models play an important role in (1) defining 
security requirements, (2) designing 
  
architectures, (3) automating security test 
case generation, especially for regression 
testing purposes, and (4) supporting the risk 
management in the process of defining and 
documenting risks. Thus, modeling is an 
enabler to manage evolution of arbitrary 
security artifacts in an integrated way for the 
entire software development lifecycle. In 
this article we focused on the graphical de-
facto standard modeling language UML and 
provided a comprehensive review of change 
and evolution aspects in this regard, 
especially in the line of the UMLSec 
approach. Modeling tools and techniques, 
however, go beyond UML. For example, 
domain specific languages recently gained 
great attention in research and industry. 
However, their potential for security 
evolution has not been exploited. 
This state of the art survey showed that 
security evolution is an actual area of 
research founded in software evolution and 
security engineering which requires further 
investigation. The security evolution 
research for some artifacts of the software 
development lifecycle is still rare and needs 
further investigation. At the modeling level, 
research on the impact of change to the 
security of UML models is still at the 
beginning. While requirements evolution has 
been extensively researched, tackling 
security issue while introducing changes to 
the requirement model has not been well 
studied so far. The same situation holds for 
architectures and regression testing which 
both have been studied extensively (H. P. 
Breivold et al., 2012; Yoo&Harman, 2010). 
But approaches to security evolution on the 
architectural level as well as regression 
testing approaches for specific security 
properties are still rare. It would be valuable 
to investigate how existing techniques for 
architectural evolution support security. For 
example, the use of graph transformations to 
model security architecture evolution and 
modifiability analysis technique to assess the 
impact of a certain evolution scenario on the 
security architecture could be of interest. 
Evolution for the remaining security artifacts 
of the software development lifecycle is 
better studied as remarkable work has been 
carried out in the areas of secure code 
evolution, security monitoring, and risk 
evolution. But for the security evolution of 
all artifact types, empirical studies, 
especially in an industrial context, are 
missing so far.  
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